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.
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at the

National Conference ot Christians &Dd J eva
Hotel. Robert '!Teat, Newark, Bew Jersey
Thursday, February 16, 1967
6:30p.m.

BROTBERliOOD AID WORLD PIACB

We meet at a time when glimmers

appeared &Dd 1 then, diaa.ppeared.

ot PMCe in Viet

lfam have

The prospects for a prompt termiD&tion

of the war bave dissolved once asain•
The ettort to britlg thia conflict to an ead, however, has not
been tutil.e.
clearer.

The words ot peace are nov sharper; their meanings are

t10V

The vflry fact that serious efforts to bring about peace do recur

ia evidence or the strength ot the will tor peace.

It is evidence of a

re8PC)nae to the prayers tor peace which rise up trom every religious faith
and trom all parts of the vorl4.
The urge to peace in Viet Nam is as one with the purposes ot
the Rational Conference ot Cbristian.e &D4 Jeva.

This organization has

stood tor dec-.iea tor civ1lity and w:aderat.ocUng uong peoples of differing

~e.ta.

It haa &lao been, in a broader HnH, a symbol of the search

tor univera&l brotherhood. That which ia h1gbeat in man

has lDng harbored

the hope for a regathering of the trasnentecl human fmil.y.

That which is

closest in

1B&D.

to what is fundamental in all faiths urges h1m to establish

bonds of understanding among races, creeds, cultures and nations.
What blocks that understanding, in its simplest statement, is
the relucta.Dce to acknowledge for others the ria,hts and respect which one
deaumds for oneself'.

By the sasae taken, at the bottom of the international

1nstabil1ty of the past two dec-'les, very otten has been the same shortcoming.

The late President, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, observed that peace

is "in the last analysis basic~ a matter of human rights.''

In October

1965, Pope Paul VI gave stress to this point vhen he visited the United
Nations.

H« linked, as inseparable, respect tor the dignity of the hum&ll

person, brotherhood and world peace. A s111l1lar awareness of this trinity
has led men of religion, whether leaders or laymen, to becocae involved in
problema of the social condition of man--of the adequacy of the relationships among men and nations.
The search for equity and unity is also seen, on occasion, in
the contemporary relations among nations.

The same spirit which brought

about the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, for example, led representatives
of sixty nations to gather at the White House on January 28 to sign a treaty
barring m111tary weapons 1'rom outer space.

Earlier in the month, President

Johnson reaffirmed the goal of' buildins bridges between East and West.
had previously referred to this soaJ. in these words:

He

"Our task is to

achieve a reconciliation with the East--a shift f'rciD the narrow concept of
coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement." Most recently,
the President hu urged the Congress to pass an East-West Trade bill during
this session and to approve a consular convention with the Soviet Union.

- 3 Conetructive iDd1cat1oll8 of this kind, however, are still the
exception in the over-all state of world affaira. The fact remains that
no significant area of the world ia yet tree of the h1Sb walla of hoatUi ty
buUt by preJudice, geed, fear, hatred and hUID&Il 1ndifference.

Bo area

is tree of the instabUity which comes with the widespread existeace of
these and other ills of the social order.
The continent of Africa, far example, 1a in the grip of an
epidemic of toppling regimes which is symptomatic of this instability.
Regrettably, the •111.Ptome
economic upheaval.

COM

to lipt at a t:lae of sr•t social and

Africa is confronted with the eimul.taneou. need tor

an adjustment of outdated colonial MDtalities, far the wholesale tranafer
of human loyalties fl'oal the tribal all tbe way to the nation-state and tar
a reordering of a sreat range of ancieot ecoDOIIlic riaiditiea.
TheM cooatitute eDOI'IIIIOu. cb•llenses to African leadership and

to the African people. They are challenpa, IIOZ'eOver, which have to be
met, even aa the continent is pl.:ualeting into a npidly unfolding tuture
f'rcm an arrested. aDd unchuaed put.

Regettably, for Ahicana, there is

little in the way of a definable present in which meo and nations
out at leisure a rationalAt for theM nw relationships.

~work

In consequence,

years if not decades of 1natabU1ty looaa ahM4 for Africa &Dod ramifications
of it will be felt througtlout the rest of the world.
In the Middle Bast, there is aot only an absence of a stable
peace, as there long has 'been, but there 1e &110 a ab.U"p r1H in the
level. of instability.

The ID08t eeriou. Arab-IU'aeli lll111tary clash of

- 4 recent years erupted Just a tw months

aso. The lid of peace which
J~nt,

restored by the United lfations is 1 in my

was

a most unreliable one.

In no eenee does it lessen the sources ot unrest and provocation along
the borders ot Israel.

Nor does it deal with the problem of the division

ot waters ot the Jol"'dan River and other maJor Arab-Israeli issues.
The tensiona which plague the Middle East ere not confined to
the relations of Israel and the Arab states.

In the Yemen, tor example,

a little known but atrocious war goes on grimly year after year.

And, in

Aden, tens of tbouaanda of Bri tisb forces are still required to maintain
a curfewed order in what has lons been a city of terror.
Ot increasing concern, too, is the &rlllB race uong Middle Eastern

nations. The concern is now intea.sitied by the prospect ot nuclear armaments gaining a foothold 1n the region.

There is em obvious need to curb

the competition trom outside, particularly in the trade of sophisticated
arms in the Middle East.

I regret to say, however, that the area remains

a truittul one for the international

81"1118

peddler•·

I regret to nay, too,

that alona with the SoTiet Union and other nations, we have been unable or
unwilling to come to serious grips with this question.
The continent of Europe is, t.o<lay, one ot the more reassuring
areas ot the world.
contl.ict.

It is prosperous and tree of it1minent threats of

Nevertheless the Europe.ns, too, have to face up to long overdue

adjuetmente in their relationships.

The concepts which are imbedded in

both the North Atlantic Tr•ty Orsanization and the Warsaw Pact are in
need of major modifications.

The tille is long past due, tor example, tor

a reduction of military forces stationed beyond home borders 1n countries
1n both Eutern aDd Western Burope.

- 5 I should note in this connection that a joint group of the
Senate Conrnittees on Armed Servi.cee and Foreign Relations v1ll. consider
a Resolution which calls for e. substantial reduction of
Europe.

u.s.

torceo in

This resolution which vas introduced by me on behalf of 44

members of the Senate embodies, in DIY'

jud.~nt,

a moat needed adjustment

in our policies with respect to .Europe.
There is one overridins reason for this resolution.
changed in Europe.

Times have

Our policies on military deployment which have kept

a mill1on American defense personnel and dependents in Western Europe
twenty years after World War II are out of date.

The obvious tact is

the.t econOl!lic and other friendly contact has steadily replaced the fear
and hostility which previously characterized the relationship between
Western and

Ea~ttern

Europe.

The likelihood, liOl"eover 1 18 for a continuance

and speeding np of the thav in the continental climate.

Looking to the sout.'l, Latin America remains in the throes of
grea.t change.

Old social syste'lls are crumbling.

upheavals are taking place.

Profound political

Economic modernization is proceeding at an

uneven but, in some instances, frenetic pace. 'l'he structures of m.an.y of
the nations of this Hemisphere are evolving rap1clly towards new but as yet
undetermined forms.
In the end, it is to be hoped that this change v111 give substance to the ideals of

1ntra-hem1~heric

pressed in the Alliance for Progress.

cooperation as they are ex-

In the meantilllfl, the peopl e of

Latin America remain divided by countless religious, ethnic, and
barriers, which block the development ot an integrated stabUity.

ot.~er

.. 6 Bovever, the beginnings of significant iq>rovement in tlle situation are

to be found in aany countries. In aomey (as in Mexico from which I have
Juat returned), it is 110re than just a beginning. Mexico is well on the
vay, in terms of broad and rapid national. progress.

It is in the vanguard

in Latin America and is able even now to make a maJor contribution of inspiration and technology beyond its borders to the advance of other Latin
American nations.
In Southern Asia, there remains the hostility between India and
Pakistan.

It is baaed in part on conflicting territorial claim.s over

JCaehm1r, but perhaps more :fundamentally it stems from old wounds and
ancient communal fears.

Throughout the vorld, the hope had been that the

Tashkent Declaration which vas negotiated by India and Pakistan, with
Soviet intercession would lead to genuine reconciliation.

Yet the first

anniversary of tb.at declaration passed, only weeks ago, not With an assured
peace but with a new exchange of bitter recriminations.

It is apparent

tbat there has been no baaic easing of tensions. The Soviet Union, having,
so to speak, taken over the Kashmir questj.on :from the United Nations by
its initiative at Taahkent last year has a continuing

re~nsib1lity

to

try to resolve the difficulty before it flares, once again, into open con-

flict.
I suppose it is a good deal less pain:tul. to consider the problema
which conb"ont other nations than to examine those which face this nation.
Xevertheless, ve we it to ourselves to look honestly at our own situation.
I lllUSt say, in all frankness, that the situation at home gives cause for
aober concern and at the core of the concern is Viet 1fu.

- 7•
VietNam is a symbol of man's faUure to deal with war itself.. which, in these times, is the f\mdamental challenge to civilized survival.
President Johnson, at a recent press conference, expressed this thought in
a most poignant and personal way when he said:

••I go to bed every night

feeling that I failed that day because I could not end the conflict in
Viet Nem. •
Viet Nam is not, or course, the President's personal failure.
Rather, it is the faUure of all ot ua.

It is the failure of this govern-

ment and of the others that are locked. in the strugsl.e in Viet Ham.
the failure of the Soviet Union and of China.

It ia

In the end, Viet Nam is the

failure of the United Nations because all governments and all people have
a Vital stake in the restoratien of peace iu Viet Nao.
The failure in Viet Nam, of which the President speaks, :S.a a.
tragic failure.

Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese weu, women and

children, who are the homeless refugees or accidental casualties of this
war, beer testimony to that faUure.

The Americans who have been maiaed

in Viet Nam, the families and friends of those who have died in Viet Nam
know the price of that failure.
In a stark fashion, Viet Nam dramatizes the gap between the
reality and the ideal of world brotherhood.
that this ga.p persists.

It is not only in Viet Nam

Within this nation it also bas existed between

the ideal of American life and the great accumulation of neglected
problems of social order.

This gap t.."lree.tened end still threatens the

stability of American society, particularly in ita great urban centers.

..
- 8 During

1966,

the nation 1-ras pocklllarked. by out'!:>ursts of severe and violent

riots in Chicago, 1n Cleveland, in Oan Francisco, in Atlanta, in Oakland.
Indeed, few maJor cities have been spared these hideouc convulsions.
In Congressiol':lS.l action during the past few years ve have made
a beginning in trying to deal vith long neglected social proble.."'lS.

Efforts

have been made and will be made to strengthen the qual1ty as well as the
quantity of available police power; to make more Just, as vell as to 1118ke
more certain, the enforcement of' law.
And many measures have also been passed in an effort to build
greater sta.bility into the nation by helping the poor, the be.;ildered and
the alienated of the laDd.

There comes readily to mind the National

Teachers Corps to serve in poverty-stricken areas, the voting rights and
other laws to bring greater equity of treatment to all races, the city
demonstration program, aid to Appale.chia., the Manpower Development and
Training Act, and the M&licare program.
'l'b.ese and many other social laws eoacted by the recent Congresses have been the acts of sensible political leadership and alert
government.

But they ere also something more. They N'e acts out of

America •s conscie!lce. They are long-postponed essentie.l. services to
the well-being of all American• and to the future of this nation. Whatever shortcomings or excesses are revealed by experience--and I know there
will be

nome~-tb.ey

can and will be corrected..

The legislative basis of

the nation'• social structure will. be improved; it will be strengthened.

•

•

~

c ..

- 9In the enda.-

1
•

•

I am confident that this great body of

legislation will hel;p to make the United States a place 1n which all
people regardless of individual. differences can find a dignified and
livable setting for their lives.

That is a goal Which expresses the

ideal of American life but 1 t is also a goal which will strike a responsive cord in every other enl1S}ltened nation.

Indeed, it is a goal which

can be pursued in cOCJmOn with them for the benefit of all the world 'a
people.
However broad this concept, the beginnings lie with each of

us.

By what we do and by what we leave undone, each human being has an

effect on history.

Each human being makes a difference, and each is

responsible for the difference that he makes.

In that vein the many

individuals who over the years have joine4 their efforts in the Conference
of Christians and Jevs have made a difference in this nation--a constructive difference.

In so doing, they have made a difference--a constructive

difference--in this nation •s relations with other nations.

I salute you

for what you have done and for what you will yet do, for brotherhood, for
this nation and for peace.

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
WASHINC TO N, 0 . C. 20540
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VISION

I consider it a signal honor to have been invited to speak to
you today.

For nearly four decades your organization has marched in

the forward line of the effort to combat religious intolerance and
racial prejudice.

While encouraging the preservation or each religion's

tenets, you have stood as a symbol of civic cooperation and mutual
understanding among men.

Significantly, you are even nov preparing

to observe one of your most wll-known and vorthwhile activities Brotherhood Week.
Today I vould like to share vith you some or rq thoughts on a
subject, which, as Joseph Auslander stated so vell, elicits "a hunger
in the heart and in the soul a vision."

every religion -

It is a precept or almost

the ideal of brotherhood.

In \Jest Berlin near the Chauaseestrasse crossing point betveen
the Eastern and Western sectors of the city stands a statue of two
men.

They lean toward each other, hands outstretched and touching,

each looking into the other's eye a.

The sculptor called his vork

"Hope tor Reunification," its moat immediate application meaning, of
course, the longing for reunification ot East and West G9rtna.ey.

Yet,

to me, the statue imparts the universal striving of men as brothers,
regardless of color or race or religion or nationality.

Thus, as men

recognize the living God as the !'ather of all, so do they also believe
that the7 are bound to each other.

This relationship begins in the

family, expands through the synagogue or church, through religious
groups or denominations, transcends national boundaries, and spreads

LRS-2

throughout the world.

That which is highest in man harbors the hope

tor reunification with his

human brothers.

let, as we are well aware, men can never be reunified until
there is ro.ore perfect understanding between all races, creeds, cultures,

and nations.

Until the veils of prejudice, distrust, ignorance, and

resentment have been swept from his mind and heart, man can never
achieve his goal of brotherhood.
It would eeem to me that the increasing interdependence of man
with man makes it imperative that we begin to lr..1n, the ideal of
brotherhood, \lhich, simply stated is giving to others the rights
and respect one wishes for himself.

lfuen we survey the two decades

since the Second World War, we see the direct resul ta of detl11ng
others respect and human rights.

InternAtional crises have all too

often involved human rights issues, whether religious, ethnic, or
racial.

As our late beloved President, John F. Kennedy, observed,

peace is "in the last analysis basically a matter of human rights."
In this age of earlybird satellites and instantaneous communications,
the world has suddenly become a single city.
into a single community.

Our task is to mold it

Toward this goal man has already taken the

first halting steps.
The unforgettable and historic visit of Pope Paul VI to the
United Nations in October 1965, symbolized both the necessity and desire
of man toward brotherliness .

In the space of time or one sunrise

to the next, l-ope Paul tlew trom the Vatican to ltev York City and

LRS-3

back again.
admonished,
hands.

From the rostrum ot the univer3al organization he
~~~

you wish to be brothers, let the arms fall from your

One cannot love whUe holding offensive arms. n After his

message, the representatives of all members of the United Nations
paid him the tribute of a standing ovation.
The journey of Pope I aul also symbolized the increasing tendency

ot men of religion, whether leaders or laymen, to become involved in
problems of social conditions and world peace.
religions are heard increasingly as in praise and counsel.

Voices of the

in protest and dissent as well

The two encyclicals of Pope John XXIII on

world social and economic conditiona revealed the commitment of r is
faith to a more active role in the world.

Jewish theologians hnve

been vigorous advocates of equality and respect for human rights.
Dr. Julius Mark

As

ot the Congregation Emanu-EJ. in Nev York City stated,

". • • the [ civll rights J law, to be ertective, JIIIlst not only be
vritten in a book, rut, to quote the prophet Jeremiah, it tn\l&t be • • •
written in their hearts." Many clergymen of all taiths are participating
in the effort to achieve social justice tor all men.
Along with concern about civil rights we are witnessing an ever
increasing effort to foster understanding among different religions.
Symbolic of this have been meetings between heads of the world's
religions, for example the discussion between Pope Paul and Patriarch
• thenagoras I, head of the Eastern Orthodox Church, in Jerwsalem in

1964. During March 1966, Pope Paul and the Archbishop of Canterblry

LRS-4

met in Rome to discuss unity issues.

/.nd beginning on January 22

of this year a Week of Prayer far Christian Unity wu observed, not
only in the United States but thrOlJ8bout the world.

1966, Francis Cardinal Spellman,

During November

1n a ceremony at Catholic University

here in Washington, pledged members

ot hie church

to foster "stronger

and more extensive bonds of mutual understanding, of respect, and of

cooperation" with Jewe.
Thus, particularly in this decade, I would say that we are
witnessing some marked changes in the attitudes or and relationships
among the various religions.

Century-long tensions are being eased.

There is a new willingness to live-e.nd-let-live.
brotherhood and tolerance is evident.

A greater sense of

There is no diepoaition to make

s acrifices or adjustments which violate men's religious consciences,
and that is as it should be.

For, as your organization points out,

brotherhood and cooperation can best be achieved when each man follows
his religious conviction and allow his brotheT to do likewise.
On the political world scene, too, man is increaaingly conscious
of his interdependence with men of other faiths and nationalities.
For example, in the spirit in which the nuclear test ban treaty of

1963 waa signed, representatives of sixty nations gathered at the
White House on January 28 [1967] to sign a treaty barring mUitary
weapons f'rom outer space.

And, earlier 1n the month, in bia State or

the Union message to Congress, President Johnson reaffirmed his goal of
building bridges between East and West.

On October 7, in Nev York

City, the Preaident had declared that, "Cur task is to achieve a
reconciliation with the East -- a ah1tt from the narrow concept of
coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement."

Coincident

with this policy, the United States and the Soviet Union have exchanged

cloud photographs taken from weather satellites and have agreed to
open direct commercial air nights v1th each other.

The United States

bas entered into a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union for
another two years.

And the Fresident has urged the Congress to pass

the F.ast-llest trade bill during this session and to approve the consular
convention with the Soviet Union.

In addition to the moves toward reconciliation between East and
West, the more industrialised n11t!ons are slowly recognising the
necessity to join together to aid the underdeveloped world.

A:s

I

have otten emphasized, the great need is for cooperation vith other
nations in dealing vi th the underdeveloped lAnds.

'l'hua I have been

pleased to see the World Bank expanding ita use ot eoDJiortia and

consultative groups and using them effectively as a basis for common
discussion among donors and recipients or aid as to bast development
policies.
Yet, despite the:se encouraging signs, if one revievs the current
international situation, he is sobered a.nd grieved by what he seea.
Darriers of race, religion, and ideology continue to separate man

trom

JDan.

It is evident that too rev men believe what Robert Frost

expressed in hi• poem Mending W•]J a

LRS-6

Before I built a w1l I'd ask to know
\lhat I was walling 1n or valling out,
And to whom I was like to give offense.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
D;iat ya.qts it down!
And no area of the world is free of the valle built by prejudice,
greed, self-interest, and intolerance.
/~rica

today is in

th~

throes of a chaos caused b,y rapid trans-

formation trom traditional to modern society.

The struggle

tor treedom,

as we well know from our own national experience, is never harmonious
or easy.

Thus, Africa is rent by tensions resulting tram rapid social

and economic changes, opposing loyalties to tribe and nation, racial

difficulties, and the remaining vestiges of colonialism.
In

1966, Africa continued to

be torn by two major problems --

the search for appropriate governmental
in southermost Africa.

inatitutio~

In no less than seven countries military

regimes overthrew and replaced civilian governments.
southernmost

.~ioa

and racial tension

In the area

or

which remains under white rule, racial tensions

continued to contribute to unrest and instability.

Nigeria provided the

world with a grisly example of the results of unbridled tribal and
religious tensio!l8.

In that nation, where political stability bad seemed

relatively strong, a military coup in early
another.

1966 was soon followed

by

The conflict in Nigeria all but destroyed the national

army as a unifying force within the country.

The Ibo tribe became the

focus ot great resentment b,y other tribe:J, and hundreds of thousands
ot Ibos were forced to nee to the safety of the Eastern Region of the

LRS-7

country.

Thousands were slaughtered by their ovn countrymen 1n the

cities, villages, and even in the bush.

Thus did the walls of religious,

tribal, and regional hatreds destroy national harmony in Nigeria.
In the Middle East political tensions continued

realization of peace.

to prevent the

In November occurred the most serious mUitary

clash between Israel and the Arab nations since 1956.

The borders

betvoen Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan are a perpGtual source
of contention and unrest.

The waters of the Jordan River are an

increasing point or conflict for the countries of this arid region.
:.nd of more and more concern today is the threat of an arms race between

Middle East nations, intensified by' the specter of nuclear proliferation.
wbile Europe is among the most prosperous and relatively stable
areas of the world, it continues to face momentous political and social
p!'Oblems.

'l'be diaangngement of Franoe han the North

.-~tlantic

Treaty

Organization vitbin the last year has led to considerable soul-searching
among the other members.

although the nations of Western Europe continue

to expand contacts with the East Europeans, the Berlin Wall still
stands as a reminder of the cleft between East and West.

The dit:f'ieult

and intricate problem of a divided Gol'IIIB.ey' remains as the central road-

block to fUrther progress toward a stable peace in
to tbe level of tensions at the close or
first time in three years the Berlin

t~t

region.

A key

1966 was the fact that for the

~11

vas closed to Yule visits.

Woat Berliners were allowed no Christmas passes through the vall to
visit their relatives in the Eastern part ot the city.

LRS-8

Within tha nations of Western Europe uocial tensions contribute' to
national disharmony.

For example, in Belgium, tho language question

stands as a divisive issue betveen the Prench-epeaking \t.'alloons and their
Dutch-speaking nemish countrymen.
exami nil'lg

Great Britain is in the midst ot

the formidable problema arising f'rOlll the inflow of immigrants

ham. other parts of tho Commonwealth.

ll.nd social tensions resulting

han the presence of thousands of Algerian refugees continue to trouble
the French.
Cur neighbors to the south 1n Latin JDerica are embroiled in
great and often unsettling change.

The economies or all these nations

are changing, old soc1.al systeu are crumbling, and profound political
upheavals are taking place.

The more than 220 million people of the

continent are divided by countless religious, language, cultural, and
ethnic

barriers.

Most of them live in extreme crippling poverty,

more intense than we here in ll:merica can imagine.

The cbasa between

the few who "have" and the vast majority who "have notn is almost
insurmountable.

While the United States through the Alliance for

f rogress program has tried to alleviate some of the sb;ect poverty,
vo are becoming increasingly aware or the enormit;y or the task before ua.
In Southern Asia, India and 1aldstan are still tar f'r011 solving
the disseneion over Kashmir.

The festering

b~. tt.ernGso

bGtwean them is

based in part on conflicting territorial claims over Kashmir, 1n part
on raligioua differences, and in part on old vounds suffered in the
partitioning of the continent in 1947.

"nlroughout the world men had

LRS-9

hoped that tho Tashkent Decluation, signed on January 10, 1966,

vould lead to easing of tension and eventual reconciliation.

Yet the

first anniversary of that declaration passed only veeks ago with an
exchange of bitter recriminations botveen Indian and Pakistani
leaders.
In the Far East the contlict in Vietnam continues to present man
vith the most troubling international problem of all.

The outcome of

tMt terrible struggle vill be or critical consequence to the entire
vorld.

In a very direct vay Vietnam involves the veil-being of every

American and the future of the United States.
Vietnam stands as a great tragedy of mankind.
of man's failure.

It is a symbol

For the hundreds or thousands of Vietnamese people

made homeless by the war, for the families and t'riends of the brave
men vho have died in that conflict, and for all those deepl)'

concerned

about 1ta outcome, it dramatizes the chasm between the reall ty and the
ideal or world brotherhood.

We pray that we may soon find a suitable

solution to that twrible struggle •
.o:\8

vo all know, our ow homelnnd baa not bem unsullied by social

tensions.

Many of our citizens pass truncated lives, caused by such

factors as racial discrimination or economic deprivation.

Within the

past few years such problema, having accumulated over a period of
m&ey'

decades, have arisen to challenge the stability of our nation's

political and social structures .
n~v

Rioting in our cities, a relatively

J:roblem, is the extension of the old ills of slums laden with
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filth, poverty, unemployment, poor housing, inadequate medical

During

service, and the heaviness of hopelessnees and despair.

1966,

the country vas pockmarked by outbursts of violence -- in Chicago,
in Cleveland, 1n S:.:.n Francisco, in Atlanta, in Oakland.

cities have been

~pared

Few major

the convulsions of social unrest.

And vhlle

we cannot allow acts or violence and lawlessness to continue, neither
can we allow the conditions which cause them to

~emain.

It bas been my privilege to be a part of much or the Congressional
action to correct manJ of

~erica's

social inequities.

During the last

two years the Eighty-Uinth Congress, sometimes called the Great Congress,
or the Congress with a Social Conscience, has passed
designed to help the poor and alienated or our land.

~

measures

For example,

it established and appropriated funds for the National Teachers Corps

to serve in poTerty-stricken areas.

It enacted the most comprehensive

voting rights law to receive Congressional approval 1n ninety-five
years.

It established a nev city demonstration program of Federal

grants and technical assistance to help cities remove areas

and blight.

ot

It authorized $1.1 billion in aid to Appalachia to revive

the econOJJJy of that area and to improve the skills and health
people.

slUlll

or

its

It extended the Manpower Development and Training Act to

June 30, 1969, and provided needed flexibility to permit more effect ive
means of' coping with t he problems of' the disadvantaged and hard-core
unemployed.

\

.

"
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These, then, were a fev of tho moasurea passed by Congre:ls to try
to equalize freedom of opportunity tor all our citizens.

Its mission
the
was to make this nation a better place in which to live and, to/extent
posaible, to contribute to the malting of a better vorld.
For you gathered here, and for many Americans and many people
throughout the world, that goal

ot a better wrld 1s theirs also.

In order to attain 1 t we lJIUSt move with dignity" but without surcease

against the barriers of human 1nequ.el.ity.

Even though we &re sombered

and otten discouraged by the lack of brotherly feeling among men, the
ideal

ot brotherhood is our onl7 hopo. To attain that goal, we must

see that no outdaUMl myth or ancient hatred lies une:mmined.

We must

neglect no opportunity in the slov pa1natek1ng search for peace.
Let me say once more th&t we must not allov the lodestar of
brotherhood to fade, regardless of the chasm betveen reality and our
aspirations.

And, as your organization has stressed time and again,

w must never lose sight of the importance ot each individual upon
this mighty cause.

For by vhat we do and by \lhat vo leave undone,

each has a genuine effect upon history.

EUch man makes a difference,

and each is responsible tor the dirterence

t~t

he makes.

Under the guidance of God ve must persist in our quest for the
interests vhich unite nations, for the policies which bind them together,
for the institutions which transcend rival national interests, and !or
the international inst.rumfmts or law and security.
taking requires patience and fortitude,
realized.

This great under-

tor it v111 not be quickly

It requires courage, f'or it is a difficult, even lonely,

..

..
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search.

It requires a higher human thinking and action

must beoane tha guiding principle of

otu"

tor it

dally lives.

Hence is tho great teak before us -- the reunification of man
vi th his fellOlii!Wl.

Cur mainstay 1n this magnificent venture is the

Father of us all, the living God .

For He is the solo source of . the

ansvere to the questions which have plagued man since the beginning

of time.

Truly has ho been our help in ages past.

strength and our hope for the reunion of man with

He remains
Dl&ll.

O'lll"

ADDRESS BY SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. 1 MONTANA)
Before the
Carolina Forum, The Univer sity of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Monday, March 13, 1967
8:00p.m. (Egr)

(

CEN!'RAL CONCERNS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Prior to my coming to Congress a quarter of a century ago, I
thought my stock of solutions to the questions of foreign policy was
quite adequate.

In fact, as a teacher of history at the University of

Montana, which I was, I had a touch of what Senator Fulbright might call
the arrogance of brain power.

In more common idiom, there were times

when I thought I knew it all .

That, may I say, is a failing common to

exceptional historians, from Herodotus to Schlessinger.
As a new Member of Congress, my background in history was highly
useful .

I also discovered, however, that my knowledge of international

affairs did not go very far.

It did not begin to provide much of an under-

standing, let alone answers, to the critical issues which were emerging
as World War II drew to a close.

In those days, most of us in government

suffered from serious imperfections in our notions of the outside world
and widely-held but unfounded hopes for an automatic postwar peace under

the United Nations.
We took many wrong te.cks- along with the right ones in the course
of our foreign policy.

For many decades to come, historians will be en-

gaged in sorting out the one from the other.
We made them in Europe .

\ve made mistakes in Asia.

We made them in the United Nations • We made them

over the whole range of emerging new international issues.
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I, for one, felt my limitations and recognized the need to
become a student again.
the floor.

My classroom was Congress, in Committee and on

My extracurricular activity included a great deal of foreign

travel, extensive reading and not a little reflection.
To this day, a student I have remained; an expert I am not; and
teaching is the profession to which, at some point, I may return.

In the

latter connection, I should note that my name is still carried, on leave
of absence, on the roster of the University of Montana.

Moreover, thanks

to a seniority system in college teaching, second not even to that of the
Congress 1 I now hold the rank of full Professor of History.
I am constrained to point out that teaching and legislating are
the two outstanding examples in American society of the application of a
major tenet of Confucianism:

that the accumulation of years is to be

equated automatically and unquestioningly with the accumulation of wisdom.
This principle, I know, is insufferable to the young, tolerable to the
middle-aged, and a comfort to those full of years.

At this point in time,

I must confess that I find a system of seniority tolerably comfortable.
For the present, I have no hesitancy in invoking the authority
with which seniority endows me, in order that I may speak to you on what

seems to me to be the central concerns of contemporary American foreign
policy.

Since the end of World War II, I have watched clusters of inter-

national problems coalesce into these concerns.

The problems cover a

whole range of new and tumultuous change. They are, in part, ironic byproducts of the immense acceleration of development in science, education
and communication, transportation and other technologies.

They are ex-

pressive of the explosion in population as well as the explosion of nuclear
devices.

They are indicative of the growth of human expectations and,

- 3 hopefully, of human enlightenment.

They are problems, however, which

despite these new twists, are still undergirded by the vast heritage of
human ignorance, fear, want, and hostility from which no part of the
globe is free.
The iceberg of change which has moved in international affairs
during the past two decades helps to explain the emergence of the U.N.
and other international organizations.

It is relevant to the social in-

stability and the militarism which have largely followed the ending of
19th century colonial era, notably in Africa.

It is involved in the

Asian catacylsms--the great economic stirrings in Japan, the immense uncertainties which brood over India and Pakistan and the political tidal
waves which, at intervals, have rolled through Chinese society .
The many-sided changes in the human condition during the past
two decades also explain the first military alliance in peacetime between
ourselves and Western Europe as well as the first major military involvements of the United States on the Asian mainland .

They help to explain,

finally, the awakening of this nation to the problems which confront the
world and ourselves as participants in its indivisible destiny.
It used to be that we tended to stand apart and aloof from the
affairs of the rest of the globe.

Some have called that period of our

history which led up to \.J'orld \.J'ar II, the age of isolation.

The charac-

terization is glib and somewhat misleading. :·le were not so much isolated
as we were insulated by a fortuitous geographic endowment .

The greater

part of the nation's historic energies, therefore, could, and, fortunately
did, go inward into the development of a rich, ample, and sparsely settled
land.

:le had little need or inclination which would stimulate us to

look much beyond this endowment for our needs and--if I may use the term--

- 4 f or our kicks .

Except to sustain a

l:i m~L ted

cu.riosity and to satisfy a

few exotic wants , we avo:i.ded an exter.swe overseas projection of Amer ican
power, particularly ou-:. s ide the vleste:::-n Hemisphere .

From a distance, we

were content to hold oux·selves up to the rest of the world, on the basis
of great material achicvcreents and the polit ical

he~itage

of the American

Revol ution, as a prime exampl e of the p8rfect ability of the national exper ience .
Since World '. far II, ho;rever, we have found. ourselves plunged,
hands, feet , ani head into the maj.nstream of the world ' s affairs.
did not seek this role .

Ue did not \-rant it .

He

Most of us still find the

clothes of a great international power, costly, ill-fitting and uncomfortable .

Nevertheles s , we are unable to get out of them .

the probability that some of us have

lea~ ned

There is even

not only to tolerate this new

garb , but to like it .
In any event, as a sequel to \.forld \.far II, this nation has come
onto the center of the stage of interna tional affairs .

In this leading

role we have expended an immense amount of resources , energy, and money
for a great variety of purposes .

l.fe have developed all manner of costly

intelligence and informational ser vices .

Vle he.ve developed towering

military services whose annual cost is novT around $70 billion.
liTe have foug.-,_t one war in Asia, and are now engaged in a second .
We have narrovTly missed involvement in several other peripher al clashes
elsewhere .

More than twenty years after \-lorld War II, we still have some-

t hing on the order of agreements for mutual security vTith 40 or more
nations .

These ag:r:eements, in effect, are commitments to military action

everywher e on the globe , except, perhaps , the Antarctic .
air for ce is on a minutes- aler t .

The str ategi c

Inter continental and other mis s iles are

- 5pre-set for instant retaliatory launching.
navy patr ols the seven seas .

Day and night the American

American soldiers are stationed in many

.lations abroad; in Europe and Viet Nam, they number in the hundreds of
thousands .
These far-flung commitments have been questioned from time to
time .

In my judgment, it is most proper that pertinent questions be

raised about them .

Not only do they involve great expenditures of public

funds, they carry, at all times, immense implications for the very survival
of the nation and civilization. As I see it, we have undertaken so many
and scattered defense obligations that any need for the simultaneous honoring of a group of these commitments would find us hard-pressed to provide
even a limited response.

For that reason, if for no other, it seems to

me we would be well-advised to look closely at these military commitments
and activities and to weigh carefully their contemporary value .
It would be futile, however, to consider them in a vacuum.
Effective surveillance must relate to the central concerns of our foreign
policy which, presumably, gave rise to them in the first place .

It be-

hooves us to see as clearly as possible whether our understanding of these
concerns is up to date.

It is incumbent upon us to test and test again

the reflexes of our policies not only for adequacy but for excess.
It will serve no useful purpose to continue to measure these
reflexes of policy by the sort of generalities which are expressed by the
terms "isolationism" or "internationalism." Hhatever may have been the
case years ago, these yardsticks have long since lost their pertinence.
The labels are no guarantee of the efficacy of any course of action or
non- action in international relations .

~ihat

is essential is not the name.

What is essential is that the course is timely and adjusts the bonafide
interests of the nation to the realities of the contemporary world.

- 6 I speak in all candor when I say that there have been tendencies
under both Democratic and Republican administrations for foreign policy to
lag behind these realities.

Until recently, a kind of inertia, for ex-

ample, has existed with regard to one of the central concerns of American
foreign policy--the United States-Soviet confrontation in Europe.

Until

recently, we have been most reluctant to bring ourselves to face, in policy,
the changes which have taken place on that continent.
To be sure, President Eisenhower sought in his administration to
restore at least a me;;, sure of civility in the conduct of U.S.-Soviet affairs,
by hie personal associations with the leaders of the Soviet Union.

To be

sure, President Kennedy, in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, removed a rigidity
which, for years had decreed that agreements should not be concluded with
the Soviet Union.

It has only been in the last year or two, however, that

as a nation we have begun to

explo~e

fully the implications of change in

Europe and to react to its potentialities in terms of our interests and
world peace.
Yet substantial change has been manifest for some time in inner
developments in both Eastern Europ e and in \>!estern Europe and between the
two regions .

In Eastern Europe, the immediate postwar isolation from the

West "Vras a severe one .

It was compounded of political and war-born

vendettas, ideological parochialisms, reciporcal fears and the in-turning
of human energy to meet the massive demands of post-war reconstruction.
Especially since the death of Stalin, however, there has been a general
loosening of the ideological and other straight-jackets throughout Eastern
Europe.

There has also been a growing response on the part of governments

there to consumer needs, the satisfaction of which involves greatly expanded commerce with the non-Communist world.

- 7As indicative of the breadth of change, communications, travel,
cultural exchange and other contacts have grown r apidly between Eastern
and Western Europe.

The rise of t r ade levels between the two regions has

been very pr onounced, and it should be noted that, Berlin Wall notwithstanding, vlest Germany leads all other non-Communist nations in commerce
with Eastern Europe .
For those \-tho read the tea leaves of official sociability, moreover, I would call attention to the recent visits of President Podgorny of
the Soviet Union to Italy and the first reception of a Chief of that State
by the Pope, as well as Premier Kosygin's warm receptions in Paris and
London.

One may attach such values as he chooses to these events .

facts of change in Europe, however, speak for themselves.

The

The talk of

war subsides; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard more
clearly on all sides.

The European detente has not only begun, it is

already well-advanced.
Our reaction to change in Europe includes the groundwork of
President Eisenhower and President Kennedy as well as the bridge-building
of President Johnson, all of which I have already mentioned.
\Jhat is involved in the latter case is a sustained effort in
the direction of restoring normalcy to our relations with the Soviet
Union and a significant reduction in the military rivalry which, wittingly
or unwittingly, could lead to a catastrophic conflict .
A number of significant agreements with the Soviet Union are
already involved in this effort .

They deal with cultural exchanges,

consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer
space .

Negotiations are also anticipated, in the near future, to try to

limit the incredibly costly rivalry of adding successive and reciprocal
"antis" to the ballistic missile systems of each nation .

An attempt is

- 8 also likely to be made to remove certain long-standing and self-imposed
hindrances in law to our peaceful trade with the Eastern European countries.
Many of these measures, of course, involve not only the President
but also action by the Congress and, particularly, by the Senate.

And,

certainly, they involve understanding on the part of the people of the
nation.

However, emotions run deep on any question of U. S. relations with

Communist nations, particularly, in the light of the bloody conflict in
Viet Nam.

I am frank to say that I have my own reticences about the pursuit

of agreements with nations on one side of the globe, while a war against us
is being waged with their help on the other.

The best judgments we can

obtain, however, tell us that the rejection of the contemplated agreements
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will not make the slightest difference in the situation in Viet Nam.

It will, in no way, diminish our

casualties or hasten the conclusion of the conflict .
In those circumstances, I do not see that it serves our purposes
to turn our backs on agreements which would otherwise be in the interest
of this nation .

I do not see that we advance the cause of peace by re-

fusing to build more stable relations for peace whenever and wherever an
opportunity to do so presents itself.
Moreover, bridge-building to Eastern Europe is not unrelated to
the possibility of making constructive changes in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, changes which would also serve the nation ' s interests.

For

many years, six divisions of American forces have been consigned to N.A.T .O.
in Western Europe .

These forces and their dependents involve a U. S. mili-

tary establishment in Hestern Europe of well over half a million Americans.
It is an undertaking which represents an expenditure of billions of dollars
of public funds each year.

Yet, I would not begrudge one cent of these

- 9funds if I were persuaded that the six divisions were as essential to peace
in Europe, today, as they were believed to be when dispatched there years
ago.
But is that the case?

I have already mentioned the change in the

general climate in Europe which expresses itself in a rapidly growing trade
ao:lthe expansion of other friendly relations.

It should also be noted that

within Western Europe, there are obvious doubts about the need for the
maintenance of N.A.T.O. at the strength in which it was previously projected.
Indeed, the French no longer see any requirement for the presence of U.S.
forces, at least not in France, and they have withdrawn their own detachments from N.A.T.O. Command.

The United Kingdom has reduced its commitment

of men and resources to the Continent and has announced further reductions
unless West Germany is prepared to neutralize the exchange costs of maintaining these forces on the Rhine.

Other Western Europeans to a greater

or lesser degree appear to regard their N.A.T.O. commitments in the same
non-urgent fashion.
It is now very evident that the United States alone has felt
deeply the need to sustain the full military burden of the earlier common
commitment to N.A.T .0.

Our allies in \vestern Europe are much closer to

the firing line; yet, in a period of unprecedented economic prosperity they
are most unwilling to carry their pledged share.

In effect, the Hestern

Europeans have made adjustments in their commitments to N.A.T.O. to reflect
over-all changes in Europe and they have made these adjustments unilaterally.
The contrast in performance between ourselves and \vestern Europe
regarding commitments to N.A.T.O. in my judgment, is becoming almost an
embarrassment.

It moves us apart from the mainstream of European develop-

ments and is likely to become a source of friction on both sides which, in
the end, can only be harmful to the interests of both sides.

- 10 In all frankness, I find it difficult to acquiesce in Executive
Branch fears for Western Europe's safety which are obviously far greater
than the fear of the Europeans themselves.

In all frankness, I find some

lack of dignity in the lengths to which these fears have carried our
diplomacy . We have begged, badgered and buttered Western Europe in an
effort to stimulate a greater contribution to N.A .T.O.

In all frankness,

I did not relish this nation having been placed in the position of wearing
out its welcome in France.

I should not like to see that experience re-

peated elsewhere in Europe .

Yet it may well be repeated unless there is

a willingness to make timely adjustments.
I have, therefore, joined with 43 other Senators in the introduction of a resolution which recommends to the President that the Executive
Branch make substantial reductions in the present deployment of our forces
in Western Europe.

Personally, I have felt for several years that two or

three rather than six divisions would be more than sufficient to underscore
our adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty . That figure is in line with
estimates of present need which have been advanced by General Eisenhower
and General Gavin, both of whom have had a long association with this
question.

I find it most difficult to comprehend why two divisions are any

less effective than six in serving notice that we regard the pledge of the
North Atlantic Treaty as binding and our national security as inseparable
from that of the North Atlantic region .

To talk of six divisions as a

manifestation of international resolution and two divisions as an indication
of a revived isolationism is to reveal how irrelevant if not downright misleading these terms have become .
On the other side of the globe, in Asia, there looms another
central concern of American foreign policy.

It is the confrontation with

China, across the littoral states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Viet Nam.

- ll Almost two decades have passed since the collapse of the national
government on the Chinese mainland and its retreat to the island of Taiwan.
That event, which occurred when most of you were too young for it to be
noticed, was catac.lysmic in its consequences.

It sundered the fabric of

Chinese society and, almost overnight, brought about the disintegration of
a main pillar of postwar American foreign policy.

In the rubble, the watch-

word became "wait for the dust to settle" before doing anything about China.
Over the years, the cut-off of contact between ourselves and the
Chinese mainland has become, for all practical purposes, total .
do not go there .

Mainland Chinese do not come here.

Americans

There is not only an

absence of personal contact, there is also a complete absence of trade and
communications .

Indeed, of all the nations of the world we alone have not

only maintained a primary boycott for many years but also seek to enforce
a secondary boycott on Chinese exports .
He have had brief confrontations w1 th Chinese spokesmen on various
issues over the years, notably at the Geneva Conferences of

1954 and 1962.

Our sol e continuing diplomatic contact with the Peking government, however,
has been the meetings between the

u. s.

and Chinese Ambassadors in Poland

which have gone on regularly for many years and at which no business of
significance, so far as I am aware, has been conducted.
In short, "waiting for the dust to settle, " has remained the
watchword of this nation ' s relations with three -quarters of a billion
Chinese through the administrations of three Presidents .
dust has not settled.

In truth, the

The initial hostility between a revolutionary China

for which we had had little sympathy and ourselves was followed almost
immediately by the Korean Conflict in which we became directly engaged in
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military conflict with the Chinese .
the islands

~f

Thereafter came the near conflict at

Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits.

And now, there is

again conflict, this time, by proxy in Viet Nam.
Hithin China, during these years there have been momentous events
which have also added to the difficulties and uncertainties of devel oping
a cohesive policy towards the Chinese mainland.
nucl ear

The Chinese have exploded

devices at Lop Nor in the Hestern Asian desert of Sinkiang.

Recent

ideological conflicts have sent great tremors through the whole of the inner
political structure of China.

There has been, finally, the great cleavage

in Sino-Soviet revolutionary solidarity which has torn apart almost all of
the relationships between the two giantnations of the F.urasian Continent.
In the context of these events , it is not surprising that the dust,
for the settlement of which American policy has waited eighteen years , is
heavier than ever.

The obscurity, moreover , is not likely to be dispelled

in the near future .

There is nothing in the recent history of China which

suggests that it wil.l be easier tomorrow than it is today for us to see
clearly a direction for effective policy .

\·lhatever course of .1\merican rela-

tions with China, it will have to be pursued in spite of the dust with which
the situation is covered.
Clear-cut choices cannot be expected to be available to us any
time in the foreseeable future .

On the contrary, American decisions respect-

ing China must inevitably contain a large measure of subjectivity and prayer.
Ever- present, will be the possibility of error .

These considerations, may

I say, apply not only to what we may do respecting China but to what we do
not do .

The uncertainties and the risks exist no less in the principle of

of non -approach to which we have adhered over these years of our times .

l
- 13 History will someday estimate the contribution of this principle--its addition
to or subtraction from the interests of the United States and the stability
and peace of the Hestern Pacific.
Under the present approach, for exampl e, we know from a distance
that a great fire rages in the core of Chinese Communism.

The manifestations

are plain in the roars of the Red Guards, in the denunciations and counterdenunciations , in the sudden fall of l ong-established revol utionaries .

They

are documented in the inflamatory ideographs which are slashed over the
streets and walls of Peking and the other citadels of Chinese Communist power.
They are suggested in the political bewilderment which is seen in coastal
cities and in the provinces along the inner borders of China and other remote
areas .
Indeed, the present turmoil , is such as to make clear that Communist
political control which, for nearly two decades, was held by many to be total
and irreversible and to extend all the way from Moscow to the farthest reaches
of China is actually considerably less than absolute, even in its extension
from Peking to the distant Chinese provinces .
He can al so note, from afar, the serious difficulties between the
Soviet Union and China .
cal realm.

The strains have long been explicit in the ideologi-

They have al so become increasingly evident in the tension along

the Sino-Soviet frontier which runs for thousands of miles between the two
countries.

lihat appears involved here is an expression of the historic pro-

jection of Czarist Russian interests across the Asian mainland towards
Alaska and which, before it receded to more tractable limits, had spread
even as far as California and Hawaii.

This basic Russian projection to the

East persists and rubs against China, at least in border regions of Manchuria,

Mongolia, and in Sinkiang Province .

~4
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Conversely, an historic Chinese interest

remains in many parts of Soviet Asia which at vari ous times have been under
at

~east

nominal Chinese authority.

The clash of national interests of the

two nations, in short, is ver y r eal and so, too, are the irredentist hostili ties which it engenders.
These hostilities have been a major element in the cycle of everincreasing bitter ness in Chinese- Soviet r el ations over the past few years .
How long this cycle will last and how it will end are matters of conjecture .
Whatever the possibilities, if any, of more effective adjustment of our
policies in the light of this and other trends, however, we are inhi bited
from their pursuit by our current approach or, rather , non-approach to
mainland China.
Let me turn, finally, to the immediate and over-riding problem of
policy, to the situation in Viet Nam.

Viet Nam affects every other aspect

of our foreign relations and, particularly, the two central concerns.

It

diminishes our capacity to deal constructively with the United States-Soviet
confrontation in Europe .

To put it mildly, it multiplies the problems of

the confrontation with China in Asia.
It is ironic that once again in Viet Nam, as in Korea, a country
so small and remote from our interests as to be outside the range of even
public curiosity a few years ago has become the major preoccupation of the
United States .

It is ironic that, for the second time in a generation, we

find our selves in a devastating war on the borders of China--not with China-but with a people who have had no tradition of hostility towards the United
States and who have far more historic r eason than do we for mutual hostility
with the Chinese.

- 15 How deeply we are engaged in this ironic situation is indicated
by the current concentration of United States military force in Southeast
Asia and, particularly, in Viet Nam.

We have well in excess of

military personnel on the ground in South Viet Nam.

4oo,ooo

There are also approxi-

mately 75,000 men on the 7th Fleet in adjacent waters and 35,000 more in
Thailand with responsibilities that are tied closely into the situation in
VietNam.

In short, we have committed to this conflict over 500,000 members

of the Armed Services and materiel and equipment in unprecedented quantities
and this immense consignment is supported by additional military strength
of all kinds on Okinawa, the Philippines, and Guam.
He are in a limited war in which, by becoming deeply engaged, we
have managed to save from collapse the government of South Viet Nam in Saigon.
The objectives of our military engagement are confined entirely to the
southern half of Viet Nam.

This limited war of limited objectives, never-

theless, has already engaged more American forces than Korea.
more than Korea.

It has incurred plane and helicopter losses greatly in

excess of those in Korea.
Korea.

It has cost

It is a more difficult and dangerous war than

It is a more bitter and barbaric war.

It is a war whose end is not

yet in sight, by military action or by a negotiated diplomatic solution.
That is the reality of the situation in VietNam.
didly it is faced the better off we will be.

The more can-

At this point, the question

of how or why we became involved is moot and so are regrets over our involvement.

In my judgment, the question now is how can this war be ended at the

soonest possible moment in an honorable peace for ourselves and for all
deeply enmeshed in it.

In short, the question is how can it be ended under

honorable circumstances, before the spreading devastation, not only in North
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original objective of helping the Vietnamese people.
I do not believe that we can end this war by slogans of "get in or
get out. "

It cannot be ended by personal criticism of the President and

the Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and other leaders of the Administration or members of the Senate, regardless of the positions 1(hich they take
on this issue.

I am frank to say that this criticism, at times, goes far

beyond the merely ungracious and borders on the disgraceful.

President

Johnson wants this war ended in an honorable peace and every Senator I know,
and I know them all, wants the same thing.

If there are differences among

us they are differences of understanding, interpretation, and method.
In my personal view, and I have made it clear many times, the
conflict cannot be terminated in an honorable fashion by a withdrawal of
the United States at this time although an honorable settlement must eventually involve the withdrawal of United States forces.
The only practical avenue which I see open, for the present, is
to seek to mitigate the horror of the conflict and to restrain its spread,
while endeavoring to pursue any avenue, byway, route or whatever, as the
President has sought to do, which might lead to the negotiating table.

That

there has not yet been an initiation of substantial contact for peace is no
argument against the continuance of the effort to make that contact.

There

can be no relaxation until the war is brought to an end in negotiations.
It is essential that we pursue peace in Viet Nam in all sincerity and with
all diligence not only because, in this situation, peace has a rational and
moral validity, but also because a prompt settlement is in the interests of
the Vietnamese people and the interests of the American people .
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near future are lacking.
spreading devastation.

There is, instead, the fact of an ugly war of
All the while, the options are running out; the

alternatives which might lead to negotiations grow fewer.
Many proposals have been put forth and many have been explored.
As an example, over the past year or more I have publicly called attention
to these possible easements of the situation and for eventual settlement:
1.

In lieu of aerial bombardment of North Viet Nam,
the sealing off of the borders of the 17th parallel,
through Laos;

2.

A reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the basis
of the 1954 and 1962 agreements by call of the cochairmen, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union,
or by any participating conferees;

3. An all-Asian conference at Rangoon or Tokyo or any
other suitabl e location to consider the conditions
of an honorable peace;

4. The inclusion in any peace conference of whatever
belligerents may be necessary to bring about a
termination of the conflict in Viet l'Jam;

5· An enlargement of the Manila Conference of 1966 into
a follow-up conference, to include friend and foe alike;
6.

A face - to- face meeting of the Secretary of State, Dean
Rusk, and the Foreign Minister of the Peking government
to discuss the restoration of peace in Viet Nam.

----------------------------~} ------------------------------------------------~
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to informed French views on Viet Nam and to the views of the Cambodian
Premier, Prince Norodom Sihanouk.
and Mrs . Gandhi be considered.

I have urged that the proposals of U Thant

I have endorsed various statements of the

President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all of which have made
ciear that not only our proposals but also those of Hanoi and the People ' s
Liberation Front might provide a basis for settlement.

I have recommended

that there be not just a cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam but
that all killing stop, on both sides, in a cease-fire and standfast, on
the ground and in the waters adjacent to Viet Nam as well as over Viet Nam,
to the end that efforts may be made to initiate talks .
In some of these proposals, the President has concurred and has
had them pursued by his diplomats .

All of them, he has had examined and

if they have not been pursued, I can only conclude that there have been
sound reasons for not pursuing them.

Suggestions for peace have come from

many sources; the actual pursuit of peace in the past year, however, has
been by diplomacy and, largely, by secret diplomacy.

Indeed, that is the

case even with the efforts of the distinguished Secretary General of the
United Pations , U Thant .

In his attempt s to bring about peace in Viet Nam,

U Thant has acted in his personal and diplomatic capacity rather than in his
Secretarial capacity of carrying out organizational decisions of the United
Nations .
The fact is that the

u.

N., as an organization, has not yet

entered into the Vietnamese problem.

Some limited useoof the

u.

N. in this

fashion, may I say, was proposed in an address which I delivered at Johns
Hopkins University in November , 1966.

At the time, it was not suggested
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that course presents great difficulties because neither North Viet Nam nor
China are member states.

Hhat I did suggest, however, was an entirely

proper and precedented procedural initiative by the United Nations.

The

Security Council can issue, at any time, by majority vote a call to all
belligerents in Viet Nam to convene in its forum.

It would be entirely in

order for an invitation of this kind to include both China and North Viet Nam
It was further

8 uggested

last November that a basis for a negoti-

ated settlement could begin to be sought in a Security Council request to
the International Court for an advisory opinion on the applicability of the
Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.

I am delighted to note, in passing, that

Congress only las t week expressed its overwhelming formal endorsement of
these agreements as a basis for a negotiated settlement.
I betray no confidences when I note that, on request, I interrupted
a brief vacation last fall to go to New York for the sole purpose of discussing these two proposals regarding the possible usage of the
with Ambassador Goldberg and the Secretary-General.

u.

N. organizatio:

On the basis of these

discussions it seemed preferable at the time that the search for peace then
being actively pursued be continued via the private avenues of diplomacy
rather than in the forum of the Security Council.
That was many weeks and months ago.

In the interim, intense and

many-sided efforts of diplomacy have been exerted through many private
channels to find the key to peace.

Hopes rose during the cease-fires at

the Christmas holidays and at Tet, the Oriental New Year.

However, in the

end, diplomacy not only was unable to find a road to negotiations, it was not
able even to bring about an extension of these truces.

~

The Pope tried.
Secretary-General of the
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The Russian and British leaders have tried.

u.

The

N., in his diplomatic capacity, has tried.

Ambassador Goldberg has tried countless times.

Many other dipl omats and

officials of the Executive Branch of the government have tried.
The strenuous efforts of traditional diplomacy have been unavailing.

As indicated by recent statements of both Ambassador Goldberg and

U Thant, the slender reed of hope has shriveled.

There is now no immediate

prospect on the horizon, except for the intensification of the conflict .
That, indeed, is already in progress .

The casualties increase; the devasta-

tion grows; the dangers of expanded war mul tiply.
In the circumstances, it seems to me that a contribution to peace
might well be sought in public from the United Nations as an organization .
The Secretary-General' s personal efforts to date have been dedicated and
strenuous and be is entitled to the gratitude and support of the entire
world community.

With all due respect, however, there are other resources

for peace inherent in the Uni ted Nations, as an organization, which have
gone untapped and untried.

The U. N. does have a responsibility to try to

contribute to the resolution of this conflict.

That responsibility is

explicit in the Charter and every member nation , including ourselves,
shares that responsibility by solemn Treaty obligation.
It seems to me that the cause of a peaceful and honorabl e settlement may possibly be advanced- -certainly it cannot be hurt--by modest recourse
at this time to the procedural machinery of the United Nations .

In my judg-

ment, this nation should consider seeking a face - to-face confrontation of
all belligerents at the United Nations .

Following the Korean precedents,

it seems to me eminently desirable that this government give every consideration to a possible initiative which would bring to a vote in the Security
Council two resolutions along the following lines:
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and indirect, including China and North Viet Nam, to participate in an
open discussion of the conflict in Viet Nam and ways and means of ending
it;
Two, that the Security Council request the International Court
to render an advisory opinion on the current applicability of the Geneva
Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the obligations which these agreements may
place on the present belligerents in Viet Nam.
lVhether or not there is much prospect of a positive response from
others in no way lessens the desirability of offering these resolutions in
good faith and bringing them to a vote.

In my judgment, an American initia-

tive of this kind serves not only our interests but the interests of peace
in Viet Nam.
Let me conclude, now, by clarifying one point:

the conflict in

VietNam cannot be settled from the Congress or from the campus.

In the

end, if it is to be settled honorably, there is only one Constitutional
officer of your government who can speak for you and for the entire nation
in its foreign relations.

IVhether we agree with him or not, whether we like

him or not, whether we abhor him or lo¥e him, that man is the President of
the United States.
In a government such as ours, a Senator lives with a Constitution,
a constituency, and a conscience.

All three considerations underlie the

suggestions respecting Viet Nam which have been made here today and others
which have been expressed on other occasions.

President Johnson and all

the Presidents who have gone before him have listened to advice from many
sources, including the Senate.

- 22 It is the President, however, who makes the fundamental decisions
of foreign policy .

These decisions are of an immensity which enjoins upon

us all a high respect for the burdens which a President must bear and a
responsibility to tender to him every support which can be given in good
conscience.

In the end, these decisions will determine --insofar as it lies

with this nation to determine--the moment of peace in Viet Nam and Asia.
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CRITICAL CCMFONENTS OF CURREN.r U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

Along with rabbis, ministers and priests, a member of the Senate
is among those most acutely aware of the great range of problems which face
the nation and give rise to its principal anxieties.

Both in domestic and

international matters, Senators are compelled by their

responsib~ ties

to

chart a course through a maze of disturbing public issues.
A Senator's guide in this process is a kind of triangle .
base is the United States Constitution.
the other his conscience.
differently .

At the

One of the sides is his constituency,

For each Senator, the three angles are adjusted

During any session of Congress, however, all Senators are

confronted with the need to make decisions which, in the end, are enclosed
in this triangle .
A Senator's duties also have a tripartite character.

They involve

a contribution to a responsive Congress in a government which is responsive
to domestic needs and which governs our relationship with the rest of the
world by means of a responsive foreign policy.

Three of the Senate's

actions during this session of the Congress are illustrative.

\
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The Legislative Reorganization Act of l967, which recently passed
the Senate, points the way to the first major updating of Congressional
procedures in two decades .

The revision and extension of the Appalachian

Act which the Senate approved a few days ago is a response to the current
needs of a multi-state region left stranded by the shifting tides of economic
development.

Senate consent to ratification of a Consular Treaty with the

Soviet Union is a response to the President's effort to bring about better
relations not only with that nation but with all of Eastern Europe .
These three measures share a common characteristic .
intent, all seek to keep pace with change.

In their

It is to the factor of change--

to changes in the international situation-- that I would first address your

attention.

In the two decades since World War II, we have seen a drastic

revision in the political composition of continents .

We have witnessed

the emergence and growth of the United Nations and other international
groupings of nations.

We have been almost overwhelmed by a mass outpouring

of developments in science and technology.

We have been present at the

addition of the nth power of nuclear weapons to the already complicated
equations upon which rest world peace and civilized survival.

We have been

compelled to face the frightful gaps in the material well-being of the
world's peoples and to confront the dilemmas which the rapid growth of
population poses to efforts to close these gaps.
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The extent of change over the past two decades is also suggested
in the contrast of the haunted, war-ravaged Europe of
assertive Europe of

1946

and the glittering,

1967. It is sensed in the strivings for human betterment

throughout Latin America and Africa and in other underdeveloped regions.

In

Asia, the force of change is illuminated by the extraordinary recovery and
the technological advance of Japan.

It is felt in the vast tremors in

Chinese society.
It used to be that we were so immersed in change within our own
nation that our concern for change beyond our borders was minimal.
speak of that not so distant time as an age of isolationism.

Some

Actually, we

were not so much isolated as we were insulated in a much less complicated
world by an exhilarating national experience and by a fortuitous geography.
Our energies, fortunately, could be directed largely to the inner development of a nation which was as sparsely settled as it was plentifully endowed.
There was little need for us to look elsewhere for our challenges.

The

changing American frontier --physical, scientific and economic- - was as
stimulating and as promising of personal fulfillment as any in the world .
Except to indulge a limited curiosity and to cater to a few exotic wants,
we were inclined to avoid an extensive overseas projection of American
power.
We did not seek our present involvement in world affairs.

Even

on the eve of Pearl Harbor, as a nation, we were reluctant to accept it.
Yet, as a sequel to World War II, we became deeply and irrevocably immersed
in the affairs of the rest of the world .
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During the past two decades, we have directed tremendous resources,
human energy and nationaJ. power into a multitude of activities abroad.

The

cost of aid programs of one kind or another, for example, has run to tens of
billions of dollars over these years and tens of thousands of Americans have
gone abroad at one time or another to carry out those programs.

We have

established widespread intelligence networks and international information
services.

We have a military structure which costs around $70 billion each

year; under it, since the end of World War II, millions of Americans have
been sent abroad .
The strategic air force is on a minutes-alert.

Intercontinental

and other missiles are fused for almost instantaneous reprisals.

Our navy

is based in scattered parts of the globe and is on constant patrol of the
Seven Seas.

American forces are stationed in innumerable nations.

In

Europe as well as in Viet Nam, the level of this deployment, today, reaches
to hundreds of thousands .
In the two decades since World War II, our armed forces have
fought in Korea and now fight in Viet Nam and they have incurred tens of
thousands of casualties in the process.

We have skirted other grave con-

flicts elsewhere in Asia and elsewhere in the world.

In the Cuban confronta-

tion, the nuclear clock was stopped at one minute to midnight by a stroke
of wise and restrained diplomacy.
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We have entered into so many mutual security agreements--some
forty pacts- -that we are committed to military action in every part of the
globe except, perhaps, Antarctica.

The wisdom of these far-flung commitments

has been questioned from time to time, and in my judg;nent, properly so.
Defense obligations are now so enormous and so dispersed that were the
operative provisions of a number of these commitments to come into play
simultaneously, our ability to discharge them, short of nuclear conflagration,
would be most doubtful.
In my judg;nent, all outstanding military commitments and activities
ought to be subject to continuous scrutiny as to their current validity.
From time to time we close surplus military bases at home.

We ought not

to be reluctant, in any sense, to reduce costly commitments abroad just as
rapidly as their utility becomes questionable and their foreign policy purposes obsolete.
In this connection, I would note the large U.
ment in Europe .

For a number of years, siX

stationed in Western Europe under NATO.

s.

military deploy-

u. S . divisions have been

These forces plus dependents add

up to a quasi-permanent military establishment in Europe of over half a
million Americans.
The annual outlay for this commitment amounts to billions of
dollars.

Many have urged a reduction of the deployment on the basis of

cost or the gold drain and balance of payments difficulties or because of
the competing needs of Viet Nam..

The costs of the European dePloyment,
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to be sure, are a pressure on the domestic economy and the international
position of the dollar.

The expanding war in Viet Nam, to be sure, is an

open pit in terms of its ever-growing requirements for men, skills, and
materiel.
However, the critical issue with respect to the

u. s.

deployment

on European soil is not, in my judgment, a financial one; nor is it the
competing needs of Viet Nam .

If we require the present level of forces

in Europe, the nation can find a way to deal with the financial and other

difficulties which may be involved.

The issue is whether our security,

the security of the North Atlantic region and the security of Western
Europe--twenty years after World War II- - continue to compel the concentration of six American divisions on the other side of the Atlantic .
What is involved here is the accuracy of our current estimates
of one of the critical components of our foreign policy.

We need to ask

ourselves whether conditions in Europe have changed since NATO was
established.

We need to ask ourselves whether the present level of the

American commitment is out of step with that change.
Let us rot delude ourselves; while our military deployment under
NATO has not changed for many years, circumstances in Europe have changed
greatly in recent years.

They have changed in Russia and Eastern Europe .

They have changed in Germany and Western Europe.

When the troop commitment

to NATO was assumed, the keynote of relations between the Soviet East and
Western Europe was one of mutual. suspicion and hostility.
case now.

That is not the

Today, the tone of intra-European relations has the ring of a

reasonableness that borders on cordiality.
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Vice President Humphrey, on returning from his recent trip to
vlestern Europe, was quoted as predicting that in 20 years the Iron Curtain
would be replaced with an open door.

Whatever the situation may be two

decades hence, I venture to suggest, today, two decades after World War II,
that the door is already much more than slightly ajar, as between Eastern
and Western Europe.
The change in the general climate in Europe is reflected in the
attitudes of the Western Europeans toward NATO.

At one time, the European

allies joined with us in a willing pledge of manpower and resources to the
bud.J.dup of NATO.
louder than words.

Today, the actions of the Western Europeans speak far
The actions suggest that they have long since abandoned

earlier common concepts of NATO force goals, at least insofar as providing
their share of manpower and materiel may be involved.
The French reaction in this respect has been abrupt and to the
point.

Although still adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty, France has

withdrawn all divisions and other detachments from NATO.

Moreover, President

de Gaulle has required the removal of NATO headquarters from French territory.
Great Britain has decreased its commitment of men and resources to NATO and
is contemplating a further cutback of its army of the Rhine.

Indeed, all

of the European NATO members, to one extent or another, have lowered the
priority they attach to their military consignments to the NATO command.
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It can hardly be financial difficulties that had caused the
European allies to veer sharply from earlier military pledges; in an
economic sense Western Europe is far more capable of meeting these pledges
today tnan when they were made.

The retrenchment, instead, appears to be

grounded in the conviction that the style in which NATO was originally
tailored is no longer tne mode for Europe.
In tnese circumstances, it seems a paradox that we--alone and
apart from our Western European allies--have felt some compelling need to
maintain at full strength the pledged deployment of forces in Western
Europe.

The fears for the safety of tba t region against Soviet aggression

are obviously far greater in the Executive Branch of the United States
government than they are in the European chanceries.
This variance of view emphasizes the cataleptic nature of our
policy on troop deployment in Europe over the past fevr years.

Of late,

there have been indications of a relaxation in this rigidity.

Even though

the reductions in the deployment which are being discussed would appear
wholly inadequate, it is to be hoped that there is at least a better
appreciation of the realities of change in Europe.
Early this year, I joined with 43 other Senators in introducing
a resolution which recommends to the President that the Executive Branch
make a substantial reduction in the U.

S. milltary deployment in Europe.

In my jud@llent, the actual size of the U. S. establishment in Europe ought
to bear some relationship to what other NATO members are prepared to do
with regard to the common defense.

On this basis, I have believed for
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some time that two or three U. S. divisions would be more in accord with
current realities than the six which are stationed in Europe.

The lower

figure would be no less effective in emphasizing that we regard the pledge
of mutual defense of the North Atlantic Treaty as binding and that we hold
our national security as inseparable from that of Western Europe and the
North Atlantic region.
In all candor, I believe there have been strong tendencies to
inertia in foreign policy, under Democratic no less than Republican administrations.

The NATO situation, as I have just discussed it, is but

one case in point.
Europe.

A lag is also reflected in policies toward Eastern

Only in recent years have these policies begun to take cognizance

of the changes in that region.
It is true that President Eisenhower sougnt in his administration
to reverse some of the excesses of cold war recrimination.

He tried to

restore at least some civility to the conduct of U.S.-Soviet affairs, for
example, by his personal association with Mr. Khrushchev and other leaders
of the Soviet Union.

It is true, too, that during President Kennedy's

administration, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty removed a rigidity which for
years had decreed that no agreements, regardless of how useful, should be
concluded with the Soviet Union.

It has only been in the last year or

two, however, that as a nation we have opened our eyes to the extent of
change in Eastern Europe and have begun to explore vigorously its potentialities. We tend no longer to react with an automatic "nyet" when opportunities
for understanding and mutual advantage appear.

Rather 1 there is a new sense

of discernment which weighs opportunities in terms of our national interest
and implications for a more durable peace.
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The fact is that such opportunities have been manifest for some
time as a result not only of changes in Eastern Europe but also in the
atti. tudes of that region towards Western Europeo After World War II, the
schism in the continent was a severe one.

It was compounded of ancient

rivalries, war-born vendettas, ideological parochialisms, reciprocal fears
and the inner absorption of human energy in order to meet the great demands
of survival and reconstruction which existed in each war-shattered region.
After the death of Stalin, however, there was a general loosening
of straitjackets throughout Eastern Europe.

This development was manifested

in various ways and notably in the growing response to consume! needs on the
part of the Communist governments.

The satisfaction of these needs, in turn,

involved expanded commerce with the non-Communist world and Western Europe
was quick to welcome it.
The rise of trade levels between the two regions in the past
decade has been very pronounced.

It should be noted, moreover, that--

Berlin Wall notwithstanding- -West Germany leads all other non-Communist
nations in commerce with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

There has

also been a rapid growth of communications, travel, cultural exchange and
other contacts between Eastern and Western Europe in the last few years.
How far this process has gone is indicated by a recent Yugoslav:· :-

announce-

ment that visas would no longer be required of visitors from the West!
These facts of change in Europe speak for themselveso

The talk

of war subsides; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard more
clearly on all sides.

In short, a European detente has not only begun,

it is already well advanced.
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Our reaction to change in Europe includes the initial achievements
of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy to which I have already alluded,
as well as the international bridge building upon which President Johnson has
embarked.

What is involved in the J.atter case is a sustained effort in the

direction of restoring normalcy to our relations with the Soviet Union and
other Eastern European nations.

At the same time, the President is seeking

a significant reduction in the military-technological rivalry which, wittingly
or unwittingly, could lead the world into a catastrophic conflict.
A number of significant agreements with the Soviet Union are
already associated with this effort.

They deal with cultural exchanges,

consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer
space.

Negotiations have been initiated to try to limit the incredibly

costly arms competition of adding successive and reciprocal "antis" to the
ballistic missile systems of each nation.

Most recently, as I have noted,

a Consular Treaty with the Soviet Union has been ratified and just a few
days ago by a vote of 88 to 0 the Senate consented to the ratification of
a treaty on the peaceful use of outer space.
Emotions run deep on any question of

u. s.

relations with the

Communist nations, especially in the light of the bloody conflict in Viet
Nam.

I am frank. to say that I have my own reticences in this connection.

The pursuit of agreements with nations of Eastern Europe seems incongruous
with the war that is being waged against us with their help on the other
side of the globe.

The best judgnents we can obtain, however, tell us that

- 12 -

the rejection of the kinds of agreements which have been made or are projected
with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries will not make the
slightest difference in the military situation in Viet Nam, that it will, in
no way, diminish our casualties or hasten the conclusion of the conflict.
In those circumstances, I do not see that it serves our purpose
to turn our backs on agreements which would otherwise be in the interests

of this nation.

I do not see that we advance the general. cause of peace by

refusing to build more stable relations whenever and wherever an opportunity
to do so is presented .

If the changes in Europe constitute one of the critical components
of the situation with which United States foreign policy must concern itself,
a second is to be found in Asia.

Along the littoral of the Western Pacific,

there looms the unspoken but no less profound confrontation with China across
the states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Viet Nam.
In that region, we have yet to resolve the dilemmas of policy which
were posed by the overthrow of the national government on the Chinese mainland
almost two decades ago.

That cataclysmic event compelled the complete re-

casting of our relations with Cnina.

In the space of a few postwar years,

the framework of our relations with the Chinese central government altered
from one of great intimacy to one of great hostility.

Tne Russians replaced us

in the role of friend and mentor in the formulations of policy whJ.cu were
una.ertaken by the Peking People ' s Republic •
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Cast in the role of foreign devil by the new government in
our policy towards the mainland became a non-policy.

Peking~

Of necessity, we

settled back to "wait and see . " And through tb.e administrations of three
Pres~ents,

happened.

we have continued to look for the happening which has not
We have yet to see clearly either a way to put together the pieces

of the policy which collapsed years ago or a way to begin afresh in our relations with the Chinese mainland.
Contacts between ourselves and the Chinese mainland have dwindled
almost to the point of non-existence .

Americans do not go there; mainland

Chinese do not come to the United States. At intervals, U. S. diplomats
have had significant encounters with Peking spokesmen on various issues.
In 1950, for example, we faced Chinese Communists at the United Nations,
on the issues of the Korean conflict .

We sat down with the Chinese again

at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962, on the issues of Indo-China.
One channel of continuing diplomatic contact with the Peking
government has been maintained for many years .

It has consisted of regular

meetings, first in Geneva and then in Warsaw between the United States and
Chinese Ambassadors accredited to Poland.

These conversations--brief

encounters, perhaps, would be a better term--have occurred with great
regularity but not, to my knowledge, with results of any real import.
The absence of travel and diplomatic exchange between China and
the United States has been accompanied by a mutual abstention from other
customary international relationships, notably those of trade.

The fact
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is that as a matter of official policy, we have wanted no part of trade with
China.

That is a policy which did not begin with the new bitterness generated

by Viet Nam.

It is more than a decade old. We are the only nation in the

world, so far as I am aware, which has sought for years to enforce not only
a primary boycott on Chinese exports but also a secondary boycott on reexported Chinese products.
If the original seeds of hostility were sown, as noted, in China's
great revolutionary upheaval, they came to fruition in the Korean conflict
in which thousands of casualties were inflicted on each side.

That bloody

clash was followed by a near conflict over the Chinese islands of
and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits.

~uemoy

Now, once again, in Viet Nam the unresolved

hostility with China threatens to bring about another bloody military engagement between ourselves and the Chinese.
In the light of this succession of clashes and near clashes in the
Western Pacific it is not surprising that we are still pursuing a policy of
"wait and see." Moreover, events inside China have supplied additional
blocks to the formulation of positive policies on China. We see these events
not firsthand, of course, but second and third-hand.

However incomplete this

view may be, it is still sufficient to tell us that the Chinese have entered
the ranks of those nations with the capability of inflicting nuclear devastation.

It is evident, moreover, that there is in progress even row a great

ideological strife which gnaws at the inner core of Chinese Communism.

The
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epithets and the accusations and the protest-marches and the inflammatory
slogans tell us that political introspection in China is very deep and
widespread at this moment .

Its impact is being felt particularly in the

coastal cities which historically have housed strong Western influencesand
in the provinces along the inner borders which have long felt the pull of
the Russian presence.
Ironically, the Soviet Union has now joined the United States
as anathema in the policies of the Peking government. The origin of SinoSoviet difficulties can be traced historically to the imperial projection
which carried Russian influence under the Czars across the Asian mainland
into Alaska and as far as California and Hawaii before it began to retract.
Over the centuries there have been Sino-Soviet clashes in the border regions
of Manchuria,Mongolia, and Sinkiang.

Indeed, wherever there is a convergence

of the interests of China and Russia across the expanses of the tribal lands
of Central Asiayancient antagonisms have periodically been reactivated.

In

my judgment these historic antagonisms have been a factor second not even

to ideological differences in contributing to the bitterness and estrangement in Chinese-Soviet relations over the past several years .
However serious the current difficulties, we ought not to indulge
ourselves with the expectation that they will solve our problems in Viet
Nam or Asia.

Recent developments concerning the supply of materiel to

North Viet Nam underscore

this point.

In spite of the bitter antagonism,

the Soviet Union and China have managed to work out an agreement which insures
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the transshipment of Soviet supplies by way of China to North Viet Nam.

The

prospect would appear to be, moreover, for a diminution rather than an intensification of Sino-Soviet antipathies at this time.

Indeed, in the absence of

basic changes in the situation, the level of interdependence between Russia
and China is likely to continue to rise the longer the Vietnamese conflict
persists.
In any event, we are restrained by the "wait and see" approach
from making adjustments of policy which would take cognizance of changes
in the Sino-Soviet situation.

I might add that we have waited for years,

but it is doubtful that we see our way any more clearly today with respect
to China than we did a decade and a half ago.

China remains a puzzlement,

compounded of its immense complexity and our profound bewilderment.

It is

not likely that events in China will ever fall, like Chinese checkers, into
some simple pattern which will make it easy for us to develop a new policy
with respect to the Chinese mainland and its three-quarters of a billion
people. Whatever course we follow will involve a great measure of uncertainty and a high degree of risk.
That is true for our present course or, more accurately, the
non-course.

Have we dared to ask ourselves, for example, whether or not

the ten or fifteen years in which policy has been in abeyance in regard
to the Chinese mainland might bear some responsibility for the tragedy in

which we are presently involved in Viet Nam?
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Let me turn, then, to that tragedy, to Viet Nam.
critical focus of this nation ' s present anxieties .

It is the

It commands the atten-

tion of the Administration and the Congress almost to the exclusion of other
pressing issues .
lations .

Abroad, Viet Nam affects every aspect of our foreign re-

As for relations with Europe, the involvement in Viet Nam narrows

the scope of response to significant change .

As for relations with the

Chinese mainland, the involvement in Viet Nam vastly complicates the difficulties which have long been pr esent.

Moreover, with every military escalation

we are brought closer to another mil itary involvement with China.
It is ironic that a small country whose name , Viet Nam, was scarcely
known in the United States twenty years ago has become a critical component
of the nation ' s international affatrs .
China ' s border with one of China ' s

11

It is ironic that we are engaged on

natural enemies 11 but also with a people

for whom we have no tradition of hostility.

It is ironic that this phenomenon

has occurred twice in less than two decades, the other occasion being, of
course, Korea .
One indication of the depth of our involvement in Viet Nam is the
great concentration of United States military forc es in the Southeast Asian
region.

On the ground in South Viet Nam there are now more than 430,000

American forces.

In the waters, offshore, there are the additional 75,000

men who compose the 7th Fleet .

Another 35 , 000 American soldiers are stationed

in Thailand, performing duties which are largely connected with the situation
in Viet Nam.

In total, then, well over half a million of our armed forces

are consigned to the Vietnamese conflict, along with massive amounts of
supplies and equipment .

Theae

forces are backed by powerful elements

of American military strength in Okinawa, the Philippines and Guam .
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A year and a half ago, I returned from Viet Nam and reported to
Congress and the President that we were engaged in what was, in effect, an
open-ended war whose conclusion was not in sight. At that time, the commitment of U. S. forces had not yet reached 150,000 and the bombing of the north
was sharply circumscribed.

A few days ago, the Commander of the United States

forces in Viet Nam, General Westmoreland, told a convention of the Associated
Press:

11

I do not see any end of the war in sight."

In the months between

these two comments, there has been the immense increase both in the
manpower commitment and the level of military violence.

u. s.

The war, however,

remains open-ended; there is not in sight any military way to a conclusion
which bears a rational relationship to the original purpose for which the
commitment was undertaken.

It will be recalled that that purpose was to

help the people of South Viet Nam preserve their freedom of political choice
and to assist them

and all

the people of Southeast Asia to build a better

material life for themselves.
However it may eventually be brought to an end, it seems to me
that the war in Viet Nam is not going to be resolved by personal criticism
such as that which, from time to time, has been aimed at the President, the
Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and others.

Nor, may I say, will it be

resolved by the stifling of the constructive debate of dif'ferences in or out
of the Senate.

Differences of viewpoint, responsibly arrived at and responsi-

bly expressed, in my jud@llent, are essential to a solution in Viet Nam.
Restrained and thoughtful debate of policy is not a luxury, it is a necessity.
Insofar as President Johnson is concerned, he is opm to any
suggestions which may emerge from discussion and debate and which may hold
some promise of peace.

He knows as do we that the crucial question is not

-

~9

-

how this war began but how this war can be ended at the
moment and in an

honorab~e

manner .

An

honorab~e

ear~iest possib~e

ending is not going to be

brought about by simp~istic form~as such as "get ~ the way in" or "get
~

the way out. " An honorab~e ending is not going to be brought about by

the spread of

mi~itary vio~ence,

north and south, for

ourse~ves,

with its attendant tragedy for

and for

~

~

Vietnamese,

concerned .

President Johnson ' s concern with this tragedy is as deep as yours
or mine- -deeper perhaps because he has to live with it twenty- four hours a
day.

The

~timate responsib~ty

is his and, for him, there is no surcease.

Insofar as the Senate is concerned, there are many viewpoints on
Viet Nam, but there is unanimity on the
this war in an honorable peace.

desirabi~ity

of a prompt ending of

Indeed, a few weeks ago by a vote of 89 to 2

the Senate endorsed a continued search by the President acd others for a
negotiated settlement of the conflict .
As for
practicab~e

mys~,

I have expressed the view many times that the

o~

course is one which seeks to contain a further spread of the

conflict in Asia, one which seeks to

~imit

our involvement in the conflict

while the effort to achieve an honorable settlement is intensified.

The

failures so far to find the formula which might lead to negotiations, in
no sense, divests us of the obligation to ourselves, to the Vietnamese people
and to the world to continue the search.
To that end, many suggestions have been made .

Over the past year

or so, for example, I have publ icly proposed the following:
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1. Military emphasis should be placed on sealing off of the
northern border of South Viet Nam at the 17th parallel by the construction
of a line of defense which could be maintained largely by South Vietnamese
forces as an alternative to the continued bombing of the north.
2.

The reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the basis of the

1954 and 1962 agreements, by call of the co- chairmen, the United Kingdom.
and the Soviet Union, or by any other participants;

3· The holding in Rangoon or Tokyo or in any other suitable place of
an all-Asian conference to consider the conditions of an honorable peace in
Viet Nam;
4.

The inclusion in a peace conference on Viet Nam of any and all

governments or groups whose concurrence may be necessary to bring about an
end to the conflict;

5.

The broadening o! the ManiJ.a Conference of 1966 to include

Cnina and other non-participating nations in Asia;
b.

Tne arrangement of a face - to-face meeting of Secretary of

State Dean RuSk and tne Foreign Minister of the Peking government to discuss the restoration of peace in Viet Nam.
In addition, I have suggested that our policymakers examine with
great care, the views expressed by the French government, as well as by the
Cambodian leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

I have urged that the proposals

of U Thant and Mrs . Gandhi receive consideration.

I have endorsed various

statements of the President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all
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of which have made clear that not only our proposals but also those of
Hanoi and the People ' s Liberation Front might provide a basis for settlement .

I have recommended that there be not just a cessation of the bombing

of North Viet Nam but a general cease-fire and standfast, with a halt on
both sides, to maneuvers on the ground, in the sea, and in the air, to the
end that efforts might be made to initiate talks .
Many others in the Senate and elsewhere have offered suggestions.
There has been no lack of proposals .
channels of traditional diplomacy.

Many have been pursued through the
The distinguished Secretary-General of

the United Nations, U Thant, has been a central figure in these secret
diplomatic efforts to bring about peace .

In spite of his great efforts

and those of other diplomats and men of good will, peace is no closer.
This factor has led me to question an apparent reluctance to bring
into play the more formal machinery of the Charter of the United Nations in
an effort to break down the barriers to peace.
again today.

I question this reluctance

The fact is that the U. N., to date, has not even taken

official cognizance of the existence of a conflict in Viet Nam.

That sort

of ostrich• approach seems to me to court for the organization irrelevancy
at best and eventual disaster at worst.
I do not believe anyone has a right to expect, with respect to
Viet Nam, a miracle of peace from the U. N.

I do believe, however, that the

peoples of the world have a right to expect some public indication of concern
of member nations, as to the dangers of this conflagration.

There is a

right to expect, at l east, some effort to use the machinery of the Charter
to dampen down the flames in Viet Nam before the war goes entirel y out of

control.
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There are, of course, great difficulties involved in the assumption
of an active role by the U.N. with respect to Viet Nam.

Two of the principal

parties concerned--North Viet Nam and Communist China--for example, are not
members of the United Nations .
tion from the U. N.

That does not foreclose , however, a contribu-

It has seemed to me entirely appropriate• • • • • •

that at the very least, the U. N. should open its forum to discussion of the
problem by all involved directly or indirectly in Viet Nam--members and nonmembers alike.
subject to veto.

Such a procedure is proper; it is precedented; it is not
There is no reason, so far as I can see, why the Security

Council cannot offer to bring together not only the member states who are
most intimately concerned in the situation--that is, the United States and
the Soviet Union- ·but also the non-members, that is, Communist China, North
Viet Nam, the government of South Viet Nam and any other group of relevance

to a peaceful settlement.

I should think, too, that the Security Council

might also consider requesting the International Court of Justice to render
an advisory opinion on the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. All of the
belligerents have made reference, from time to time, to these Accords as
the basis for a peaceful settlement. Certainly, it is appropriate to try
to see through the impartial and judicious eyes of the Court what the
applicability of these agreements may entail in present circumstances.
Let me make clear that I suggest the pursuit of peace through the
U.N. Security Council not in lieu of private or secret diplomacy, not in
lieu of a revival of the Geneva Conference.

Rather, I suggest it as a
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supplement or precipitant of these approaches or any other which may hold
some promise of a solution.
As I have noted, the effort has been made since the outset to
find a pathway to peace through secret and traditional diplomacy and it
has been unsuccessful.

Therefore, I think there is everything to be gained

and nothing to be lost at this time by a public search before the U. N. for
the gaps between the positions of the belligerents and the means by which they
may be bridged.
There is no assurance that a resort to the procedural machinery
of the United Nations will produce any more significant results than those
yielded by secret and traditional diplomacy.

That will not be known, however,

unless and until the approach is tried.
Insofar as this nation is concerned, I cannot see that we violate
our own interests or the interests of any other nation by a vigorous pursuit
of peace at the U. N.

Based on the Korean precedents, our government can

very properly urge upon the Security Council a vote on these two specific
resolutions pertaining to Viet Nam:
One, that the Secretary General be instructed to invite
governments and groups directly and indirectly involved in the Vietnamese
conflict, including China and North Viet Nam, to participate before the
Council in an open and unlimited discussion of the conflict;
Two, that the Security Council request the International
Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the current applicability
of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the obligations which these agreements may place on those directly or indirectly involved in the Vietnamese
Qonflict.
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In closing, may I emphasize that the responsibility for the conduct
of our nation's foreign affairs is vested in the President of the United
States. Whether we agree with him or disagree, whether he pleases or displeases us, will not lighten one iota the onerous burdens which rest on his
shoulders as a result of the Vietnamese conflict.

The President may look

for advice to his aides in the Executive Branch.

He may look to the Senate

and to the people of this nation.

Whether or not advice is forthcoming,

whether or not there is consent to his course, the President still must
decide what he believes to be in the best interests of the United States.
That is his responsibility.

He cannot share it--he can only assume it, on

behalf of all of us.
The President needs and should have our understanding, our help
and prayers, and the support which can be given to him in good conscience.
It ought to be borne in mind at all times that whatever contribution this
nation can make to a peaceful settlement in Viet Nam, that contribution can
only be made and will be made on behalf of all of us, in the end, by the
President of the United States.
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THE WESTERN PACIFIC
Perspective and Prospective

It is my understanding that at any given time up
to 75 ocean-going vessels can be counted in San Francisco Bay .
Within a 24-hour period, 50 planes on international schedule will
pass through the gateways of this city.

In a year, the Bay region

moves 13 million tons of cargo in and out of the nation.

Over

the same period, 400 to 500 thousand travelers enter or leave by
way of its portals.
These are figures which add to the cosmopolitan
luster of this magnificent city and I kno\'T they are a delight to
the Chamber .

They are also figures, may I say, which are not

calculated to grate on the ears of this distinguished group of
world traders .

..
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As a Senator of the United States, I share your
pleasure in an immense volume of international trade.

Since

Montana lacks ocean ports, moreover, it is quite agreeable that
a lion's share move through the waters which lie within the
jurisdiction of the sponsoring Chamber.

In view of the entrepot

which San Francisco provides for this great two-way flow, the
name "Old Gold Mountain," which is what I understand the Chinese
call the city, seems most appropriate.
There is great value in a thriving intercourse
with countries beyond our borders.

The exchange of goods and

peoples is a contribution to the nation's peace and well - being.
It is a source of enrichment of our national life.
In these times, however, any pleasure which comes
from international interchange is not unalloyed.

Rather, it is

tinged with a profound concern because Viet Nam figures in the
figure with which I opened my remarks.

You and I know that a

part of the 13 million tons of cargo is military

cargo; it is

headed for a brutal struggle in distant jungles and rice paddies.

- 3 You and I know that the travelers using the facilities of this
city are not all bent on commerce or pleasure.

The travelers

include tens of thousands of Americans outward bound for war or
homecoming from war, many bearing the scars of conflict and some
in the stillness of death.

The latest casualty figures show more

than 10, 000 Americans killed and 55 , 000 wounded in Viet Nam.
So the satisfaction which comes from a flourishing international exchange, I repeat, is diluted by the implications of Viet Nam.

Viet Nam casts a shadow not only over your

commercial preoccupations; in the same way, it also dims other
aspects of our national life .

As Majority Leader of the Senate,

for example , I have had some association with the enactment of
the legislative programs of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

These programs, in my judgment , make exceptional con-

tributions to the nation's approach to the problems of older
citizens, publtc health , education, conservation of natural
resources , recreational facilities, taxation and economic
growth , international trade, transportation, communications,
4 ; ••

- 4 power supply, and many other long- neglected public needs of the
American people.
Some of you may regard these programs in a different light.

However they may be judged, I can assure you that

from the point of view of a professional legislator , the enactment of the Kennedy and J ohnson programs represents , in terms of
volume and scope, a unique legislative achievement.
The satisfaction which might be found in the
achievement, however, is dulled by the deepening concern with
Viet Nam.

And whatever contribution the enactment of the

Kennedy and Johnson programs may have made to the public life
of the nation lies largely in the engulfing shadow of Viet Nam.
The Vietnamese conflict has something of the same
effect on the nation's foreign relations.

It th r ows into doubt,

for example, the fragile beginning in the improvement of relations
with the Eastern European nations.

It introduces a note of

diffidence into our associations with the Western Europeans who
are unwilling- - to say the least--to immerse themselves in the

- 5 question of Viet Nam.

It obscures the unfolding of events in

Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and even in other parts
of Asia which may have great significance for this nation.
That American interest should be concentrated on
Viet Nam is as inevitable as it is understandable.
tions of Viet Nam are stark and immediate.
war involves the young man next door.

The implica-

More and more the

Already i t touches

directly a great number of American hearts .

It demands much

from many in the way of tangible personal sacrifice.

Millions

of Americans have been in Viet Nam or know someone who has been
in Viet Nam.

Millions more can expect to be exposed to a

similar experience.
Viet Nam is war and war takes precedence over
other affairs of the nation.

On

no ground for confusion or doubt.

that point there ought to be
The support which the Americar

forces in Viet Nam have received has been unstinting.

They are

the best equipped and supplied military organization in the
history of warfare.

Whatever has been sought by the President

- 6 for the conduct of operations in Viet Nam has been granted by
the Congress and by overwhelming votes.

Congres~

t$

~n

record

by a resolution, which I myself happen to have introduced,
assuring to the men in Viet Nam the unequivocal support of the
nation.
That will continue to be the case for as long as
necessary.

Let neither friend nor foe be under any misapprehen-

sion on that score.

Americans in Viet Nam shall receive what-

ever they may require to carry out their assignments.

They did

not choose to go to Viet Nam; they were sent there by the policies of the United States government.

To differ with the poli-

cies in no way inhibits a sense of obligation to the servicemen
in Viet Nam.

Nor, may I add, does full support of these men

require rote endorsement of the policies which sent them there.
To insist that the two are inseparable is to equate the open
heart of patriotism with the closed mind of political conformity.
President Johnson, may I say, was among the first
to reject any suggestion that the two are linked.

I know from

personal knowledge that he welcomes responsible discussion of

- 7 the question of Viet Nam and that he is prepared to listen to
all reasonable suggestions on how the conflict may be terminated
in honor.
It must be faced frankly, however, that the end
is not in sight in Viet Nam .

It is not in sight, by military

action or negotiations, or any visible combination.

The question

of Viet Nam has taken on ever increasing significance to Ameri cans as the massive buildup of forces in Southeast Asia has proceeded.

That buildup gives to the matter another dimension by

underscoring the depth of the commitment of the United States to
help the people of South Viet Nam preserve a choice over their
political future.
In view of the sacrifices which already have been
made, Viet Nam is now embedded in the feelings of the nation.
That is all the more reason for responsible public discussion of
the issues which are posed by this situation.

Unless it ensues,

the conflict in Viet Nam cannot be placed in accurate perspective
in terms of the domestic needs and other problems abroad which
confront the United States .

- 8 I would emphasize that Viet Nam is not the sum
of our national difficulties.

Notwithstanding Viet Nam, smog

will still settle over the cities of the nation.

There will be

no letup in the pollution of rivers, streams, and tidewaters.
Viet Nam will not spare us a long summer of racial and other
tension in the smoldering cities.

Viet Nam will not reduce the

pressure of population on the police, transport, educational,
housing, and other facilities of the great urban centers.

What

is required to maintain a prosperous and inflation-free economy
and a flourishing international exchange--as you well know-will not be lessened by Viet Nam.
Problems of this sort have been the preoccupation
of the Congress for the past several years.

I believe the

legislation which has been enacted goes to the heart of many of
them.

But this legal machinery must be used energetically and

it must be used wisely.

If it is neglected, if it grinds to a

halt because of the preoccupat i on with Viet Nam, the nation will
suffer the consequences in the years ahead.

A concentration on

- 9 Viet Nam may obscure the public needs of the nation but it will
not alleviate them.

On the contrary, Viet Nam will complicate

and exacerbate all of them.
In a similar vein, it should be noted that the
flow of events throughout the world will not wait upon a disposal
of the problem of Viet Nam.

There are questions of foreign re-

in
lations elsewherejwhich the stake of the nation is also very
great, but which tend to be overlooked in present circumstances.
One has only to note, for example, the current turn of developments in the Middle East.

We may well ask ourselves is the

change in that situation as sudden as it now appears?

Or did

the crisis gather while our preoccupations were elsewhere?
I would stress, therefore, that it is vital to
consider VietNam in the context of the nation's worldwide
interests.

In particular, we need to see this conflict in

Southeast Asia in the perspective of the nation ' s over-all
position in the Western Pacific.
Certain similarities between Korea and Viet Nam
are relevant to that perspective.

Both, for example, lie at
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extremities of an antagonistic mainland China and both are on
the Asian littoral of the Pacific Ocean.
colonial dependencies.

Both are former

Both were set free but were divided in

the wake of the collapse, respectively, of Japanese and French
power.
Our military involvements in the two conflicts
developed as a response to aggressive incursions from a
Communist - linked north into an American-linked south .

These

incursions were launched, however, not in the name of Communism
but under the banner of nationalism--of national liberation and
unity .
Both the conflict in Korea and in Viet Nam have
pitted us in brutal struggle against peoples for whom we have
had no tradition of hostility.

Both conflicts have exacted a

heavy toll of suffering and destruction amongst those people
and a large price in American lives and resources .

Our direct

military involvement in each instance began as a limited effort,
on top of a prolonged period of economic and military aid to a
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weak indigenous government .

With U. N. sanction and support,

we sought to assist the South Koreans to repel an invasion from
North Korea.

This initial and successful campaign was then

pushed beyond its original purpose and led, against expectations,
into a massive and indecisive clash with mainland Chinese forces.
In Viet Nam we have had the support of certain
allied Asian and other Western Pacific nations but, to date,
the United Nations has maintained a formal silence.
sanctioned the U.S. action.

It has not

Indeed the U.N. has not yet even

'

taken formal note of the existence of the conflict.

That is,

may I say, an immense understatement of a massive oversight.
If I may digress for a moment, I would express
the hope that steps will be taken to bring the U.N. into this
question in the

nea~

future.

At the very least, the U.N.

Security Council should recognize the existence of the struggle
and seek to bring all the disputants into a cards-on-the-table
confrontation.
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As in Korea, our military involvement in Viet
Nam began as a limited support undertaking.

By air and sea,

however, the military effort has now been expanded into North
Viet Nam .

At the same time, the war in the south has become,

increasingly, an American military operation which pits our
forces against both North Vietnamese regulars and Viet Cong
guerrillas .
The expansion of this conflict in Viet Nam, in
my judgment, carries the strong possibilities of another massive
clash between China and the United States and even the seeds of
World War III.

It is not that all concerned do not remember

the Korean experience.

It is not that this nation would deli-

berately enlarge the Vietnamese conflict into a provocative
challenge to China.

It is simply that military actions once

launched tend to establish their own momentum in which one
step leads inexorably to the next.

We may well ask ourselves

before we go much further in this process how many steps have
already been taken in this fashion since the first American
bomb fell on North Viet Nam scarcely three years ago?

- 13 The successive steps have drawn U.S. military
power deeply into Viet Nam .

In this involvement, as with the

Korean conflict a decade and a half ago, we have made an immense
military commitment in a region in which our national interests
were minimal before World War II.

A quarter of a century ago,

Viet Nam and Korea scarcely piqued our national curiosity.
American foreign policy found little of relevance
to our national security and welfare in Korea.

The same was

true of Viet Nam or, for that matter, of Indo-China as a whole,
except perhaps as that region came under the control of the
Japanese war machine after 1940 .

Pre-World War II trade with

these two Asian peninsulas was almost non-existent.

Americans

did not travel to either of them in any great numbers .

In

fact, in 1953, when I visited Laos with an associate, the two
of us doubled the American population there .

Even at that late

date, there were only two young American vice-consuls living
in the entire country.

And in Viet Nam, that year, the total

of Americans certainly did not exceed two hundred, almost all

- 14 government officials and including several in an American
consular establishment in Hanoi.
The contrast, today, is staggering.

We have

mobilized in and around Viet Nam in Southeast Asia an American

~~~
military force t-.i n f xcess of half- a-million men.

We have thrown

into this conflict an enormous quantity and assortment of military materiel.
the struggle.

We have consigned great air and naval power to
Expenditures for military operations in Viet

Nam have now reached an annual rate which is estimated at $25
billion and is still rising.
As I have noted, this great commitment has been
undertaken in a region which, a few years ago, was scarcely
visible on the spectrum of the nation's interests in the
Western Pacific and of even less significance in terms of the
world-wide position of the United States.

The precipitous

increase to the present level of concern with Viet Nam raises
certain fundamental questions .

We must ask ourselves whether

the Vietnamese involvement (and, for that matter, the Korean

- 15 involvement) signifies a new concept of American interests in
the Western Pacific?

Do these incursions into the Asian main-

land signal a permanent recasti ng of our policies?
Before trying to answer theae questions, let me
refer briefly to the pattern of American policy in the Far
Pacific prior to World War II .

To put it succinctly, U.S.

policy traditionally resisted the committnent of substantial
American military power anywhere on Asian soil and, particularly,
anywhere much beyond the reach of naval support and supply.
Even during World War II, the number of Americans who fought on
the Asian mainland was but a fraction of the forces which we
have at the present time in Viet Nam.
In setting the Philippines free in 1946, moreover,
this nation turned its back on a colonial role in Asia .

To put

it another way, we rejected once and for all a dominant responsibility for the affairs or future of any Asian people.

Rather

than chase the illusions of imperialism, this nation saw its
interests in the Far East as lying precisely in the activities

- 16 which many in this group pursue for a living.

We saw those

interests in commercial and other exchange with an Asia of
peaceful, independent and developing nations.

To that end,

we were prepared to join with others in a judicious transfer
of the skills, knowledge and capital of modernization.
In my judgment, the present involvement in Viet
Nam in no way, shape, or form signals a substantial recasting
of our position in the Far East.

The Vietnamese conflict, as

the Korean conflict before it, is a consequence of the collapse
of Japanese and French imperial power.

It is a consequence of

the understandable weakness of the successor states.

Above all

else, it is a consequence of the Chinese revolutionary sweep
of the mainland and the ideological fears and other uncertainties whi ch were engendered by this cataclysmic change.
However, neither the involvement in Viet Nam nor
in Korea, I would reiterate, reflects a permanent change in our
position.

The role of American power on the Asian mainland was

and will one day, again, be limited.

We did not shake loose of

- 17 the costly responsibilities in the Philippines only to assume
them in Viet Nam by a new name.

Our extraordinary military

incursion into the Asian mainland will end as soon as the
extraordinary circumstance s which have evoked it have also ended.
In the second half of the 20th century, this
nation is a wor ld power , not a colonial power .

The global

scope of our current inter ests requires us to exercise the
responsibilities of the former even as it compels us to reject
the trappings of the latter.

In a similar vein, I would suggest

to you that the United States occupies the position

QV
of ~Pacific

~

power, not that

of ~Asian

power .

The difference is more than

semantic.
Every significant development in, on, and over
the Pacific Ocean has direct relevance to the security and wellbeing of the United States and we have a substantial capacity
to exercise a rational influence over the course of these developments .

We do not live, however, on the mainland of Asia

"' ·· : · .

- 18 and the practical reach of our influence in the Far Pacific
does not extend very far inland from littorals.

We do not

have a unique or unilateral interest in what transpires on
theAsianmainland.

To the extent that we have an interest at

all, it is an interest which is shared with other nations, in
the peace, stability, and progress of one of the great regions
of the world.
In this context, our involvement in Viet Nam
will be seen to be a temporary phenomenon.
has made this point over and over again.

Indeed, the President
He has emphasized that

we shall not pursue the course of a bankrupt and bankrupting
colonialism in Asia.

He has emphasized that as soon as an

honorable settlement can be negotiated we will reverse the
extraordinary deployment of our military power into Southeast
Asia.

He has said time after time that we seek neither territory

nor permanent bases in that region.
Once peace is restored in Viet Nam, there could

l

emerge the conditions which will allow us to resume fully the
pursuit of our traditional interests in the Western Pacific.

- 19 In particular, it is to be anticipated that the prime international events of the Western Pacific will once again revolve
around the triad of Japan, the Soviet Union, and China.

Indeed,

there are signs that this restoration is already underway.
I would note, for example, that the clash of
historic border claims and other differences between China and
the Soviet Union has shattered the abnormal monoll.thic pattern
of relations between these two nations.

Yet only a few years

ago it was commonly thought that through Communism, Russia
could fasten a permanent yoke on China.

Indeed, we find, today,

that there is not even a common Communist ideology within China,
much less one which binds the Chinese in inseparable subser-vience to the Russiar1s.
To be sure, a mutual interest intlle conflict in
Viet Nam has restrained differences to some degree between the
Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic and additional
extensions of the war, moreover, could act to strengthen the f,11f 0 '~""CI.Y
bridge between them.

If, as, and when the Vietnamese conflict
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is settled, however, the normal difficulties between China and
Russia may be expected once again to come into full play.
()../

/

.

r

~

.

Japan's relations with mainland China' have also '
f"vL

developed from the total alienation two decades ago in the

~

direction of a reassertion of natural cultural and economic

~~

affinities.

'»~

~

It might be noted, for example, that mainland

China's trade with Japan now surpasses that of Taiwan.

~

y:Y:

The

total reached $600 million in 1966, almost evenly divided
between exports and imports.

In that year, China also became

Japan's fourth largest trading partner.
Similar tendencies towards normalization are to
be found in relations between Japan and the Soviet Union .

Under

a five-year trade agreement which was initiated in 1965, total
trade between the two nations will approach half-a-billion
dollars for the year 1967, a large increase over last year.
There is also under discussion at high levels in the Japanese
and Soviet governments plans for the joint development of Siberia
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These involve the exploitation of gas resources on Soviet
Sakhalin, the building of an immense pipeline in Siberia, and,
possibly, the exploitation of Soviet timber and copper resources.
International developments of this kind , as I
noted at the outset of my remarks, tend to be overlooked in
our concern with Viet Nam.
them, particularly

Yet, we cannot afford to ignore

when they may indicate changing situations

which are of great significance to our national interests.
In my judgment, the re - emergence of a free interplay among Japan, China, and the Soviet Union is a welcome
development .

It tends to restore the normal core of relations

in the Western Pacific.

It tends also to bring closer the day

when this nation may rechannel its energies fully into the
pursuit of our traditional interests in that region.

President

Johnson, in fact, has already begun to put emphasis on these
interests.

He has been, for example, a prime mover in taking

the multi-nation Mekong River Development Project from the
drafting boards where it had rested for many years to the
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construction sites of Southeast Asia .

He has given strong but

appropriate U.S. support to the creation of the Asian Development Bank.

He has pledged our contribution to the enormous tasks

of reconstruction and development in all of Southeast Asia which
must surely follow the conflict in Viet Nam.

In these and other

ways, he has made it abundantly clear that what we seek are the
lasting achievements of peace and notthe fleeting triumphs of
war .
Peace in Viet Nam will pave the way for a reduction and return of our military forces from the Southeast Asian
peninsula .

One would hope

that it might also pave the

way for a reduction and return of our forces from the Korean
peninsula .

These pull - backs of American power , of course, can-

not and will not occur in a vacuum.

As a prerequisite, they

will require satisfactory political settlements of the problems
of the Korean partition and the Vietnamese division.

They will

require assurances of stability in the Formosan Straits which,
in effect, would involve a settlement of the questions of the

- 23 Chinese partition.

They will require the establishment of

effective international guarantees of the peace and security
of nations both large and small throughout Eastern and Southeast
Asia.

In short, they will require the liquidation of the prob-

lems left over from World War II and the Chinese Revolution.
I do not know when all involved will be prepared
for the face-to-face negotiations which are necessary to restore
and maintain a durable peace in the Western Pacific.

I do know

that the sooner there can be a rendezvous with realities in Asia
on the part of all involved, the better for this nation, for the
Asian nations and for the world.

Engelhard
R»1A.RKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD

at
Aunt Emmy ' s 90th Birthday Celebration
Friday, May 26, 1967

1 have never kept a tally of the number of speeches which 1 have
made in the course o£ t"lirty or m ore years of public life.
would total in the thousands.

5ome I have m ade as a. politician, others as

a spokes man fo r the Nation, and son1e as just a friend.
Aunt Emy, in a cpecial category.
your

I suppose it

Tonight I put you,

I stand not only as your friend, but as

ad~irer .

1 want to say to yt:>u in behalf of .liaurcen, MY dauehter, Anne, and

m yself, and all of your many f riends and admirers, that you hold a special·
place in our hearts .

You hold it because we che rish the friendship of Jane,

and your son, Charlie ·- - who reilects in his person warmth and a great
decency in his understanding and his wis<.lom -- the contributions which you
have ,"l'lade to hi. •

You hold a special place too, because you are you; be -

cause you are a lovely, charming wom an, who has given m uch to life and so
drawn much from it .
May 1 also say, Aunt Emy , that what makes it an especially m emorable
occasion is not the number of years, but what you have done·with those years .
1 extend to you on behalf of all of us, then, our warmest affection, and our
best wishes for your health, vitality, and happiness .

.,
IN THE SHADOW OF VIET NAM

Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania
Tuesday, May 30, 1967, 11 :00 A. M.

It is doubtful that there has ever been a good
time to graduate from college .
and you have arrived at it .

There is only an inevitable time

If you have a sense of concern as to

the future, it may be some't'lhat reassuring to note that it is a
feeling which has been shared by

grad~ating

c~~ :se~

~s

far back

as anyone can remember.
And, y...;·t- >

-~his

class

uncommon concern aoo'..lt the future .
circumstances.

OI~

:967 is e::.·c::.·. . :....;u to an

You graduate i?: ___common

You walk out directly into the shadow of Viet

Nam .
Since that is the case, you are
much interest in
"out there" .

wha~

I might say

abou~

the job

no~

likely to have

oppo~~~~ities

Nor do I believe that you would be especially

enthralled by comments on medicare, high't'lay beautification,
I

'

..
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antipoverty programs, the peace corps or a dozen or more other
creative and useful legislative enterprises which have been
initiated in recent years by the federal government .
I

expect that what you expect from me is to make

some sense on the question of Viet Nam--on the war and its prospects and your prospects in the light of it.
I

I

do not know that

can live up to those expectations if 1-1hat you seek is a punch-

card computation of satisfying answers.

do not have that sort

I

of information and I do not know how to run the computers .
one Senator,
which come

I

have only the personal estimates and attitudes

fro~

a long effort to try to und.ers'tand '.:hat is involved

in the problems of Viet Nam and Asia.
which

I

As

I

have only the concerns

share \-.Ti th young people as to their personal future in

the light of t!':is persisting difficulty .

I

have only an aT.·Iareness

of the curtain of uncertainty which Viet

Nam

has drawn across the

I

..
- 3 pursuit of happiness in this nation and the prospects for continued civilized survival everywhere in the l'Torld .
On the part of the United States, the eventual

resolution of the conflict in Viet Nam will depend greatly on
the President and the Executive Branch of the government.
will, also, depend in part on Senators and Congressmen.

It
In the

last analysis, ho't'rever, it l'lill depend heavily on the people of
the nation and, in particular, on the reaction of young persons
such as yourselves to

th~s

situation.

Your opinions on Viet Nam

are relevant and you have not only a right but, if you are so
inclined, a public duty to express them.

You also have, however,

an obligation to ask; you have a responsibility to listen and these
are antecedent to the responsible exercise of your right and duty
to speak.

In short, you owe it to yourselves, to your country

and to the vitality of the institutions

~n

which you have matured

to make your opinions as informed as possible.

In the hope of

contributing something to that end, I make these remarks today .
I

..
- 4 The Viet Nam war has been so often in the news
that at times it seems that for several years nothing else of
note has happened in the world .

We have had an incessant born-

bardment from the communications media .

We have been exposed

to the horrors and the heroics and to the destruction and the
dedication of this war.

We have had almost a surfeit of facts

as well as a torrent of irrelevances.

Yet the pattern of the

conflict is illusive and its purposes remain obscure .

We have

known the frustration which comes from an ever more intensely
sought peace in an ever more intensely fought war.
It is difficult in these circumstances to maintain
a balanced view of the conflict

~

our role in it.

Indeed, the

Vietnamese conflict is as a powerful drug which has been administered to the American body politic .

The effect on some

individuals has been that of a heady stimulant ; they would go all
out to get out .

For them the solution to this grim conflict is

"to pull out the stopper and let ' s have a whopper . "

I respect
I
0

~.

- 5 ·..;he right o:"

-~hose,

:rho are so

1

:::.~clined,

to

expr-e~s

d:::.ssent :'ror.!.

policies of res-vr-ai;:;.t, even to the ex·cent of calling for a re-:ur;:;.
s·co:::e-Age' bu·::; I a:. so

:respectfully disagree ui th them .

o-: Viet Na-::1. is no·c one 1·rhic:h :.eads ever

T!J.e honorable :road ou.t
more deeply into

:".LOS"C

.t~.sia.

(}, des::..rable ena to tn<:.! v1ar in v:..et !'!am is

not ·:.;o bG l'ou.."ld by exte:ndii:g the bat:clGfield::. to the rest of Southeas·... AsiE:. and ·co China.

:t ::.s, or ought to be, crystal c:ea:r to all

by ·chis :!.ate da·ce, -:hat it ::..s ve:ry easy to expand this involve:::-.ent
on

~~e

Asian

~a:::.nland,

bu~

that it :..s

i~~ensely

difficult to con-

-:~ -·-v.

:: do not believe that the circun.stances

o~

this

conflicJc hav-:. ger..erated ar:.y greajc em.;husiasm for expansion of the
"t·.rar..

Rathe::· ·chey have inducea a deep concern as to i·cs extent

and \,he elus:.. veness of its conclusion.

It is no less a concern

because i·c :..s accorr:.pa.Y!ied by a si:..en·c accep·cance of its great costs.
:r·::e fact ::.s thc.:c tile
society a:c""' changed.

~-rar be·.~·ilders.

':::he s<::nsi ti vi ties of our

Figures to·::;aling billions of dollars tend

J

...
r

-

c

· re ""... c.

n ..

no~.

:·:.:.-.:;h

0

-

-~he ~or.. - comprt!he .. ~ion

e are :::;.ot .:.r..teres..,ed .

~r~onn~ considera~lonsJ

~he

o.:.: scores i::: a

spor·~

T!nlesc af:ected d.:.:c(;c·.:.:y by

grisly casualty counts are

accep~ed

as th"' regul.....r ..o ...·r..:.. ..., cup of c o:':'ee .
:..n "Che

e;ro~;.:.r.g

demands of 1..ra:.· ·:::here is n ·.::cr..c.ency to consign to a

l.:.mbo pressing dc...e..,"t.:.c p:."o"bl""r.ls nnd other iscu .... s o ...· foreign policy .

-~~ ~duca~~- o~ess
·a.'!l ru."'l.....

·rc... y2 o.:.ll.:on a

ffiO!'l"vh,

of the
o~:

~onetary

costs of

V~et

24 o:.llicn anm.4c..l:y, to

2. 7 bL.:.:.on p"'r n.on·.:::'1 c:.· !'!':.O!"e th~ $32 bil:::.ion an~.-....a::!.y .
.
.p
. y a f._zure o...f' $2::> .o~. 11
__ :.on
_or
Cert E..-n

.nd.:.catton

o:

..,h~ cur~en~

o.

• year gl• ves so ...: :; reasona:Le

rate of speneinu for the war .

It

~s

a fi 0 ure, mor-...over, t[la·c is not ..;oing c.m:n; it ic going up .

Keep

in mind, moreover, J.::r.a·c I ar!'l speaking only of the cost of our
m::.litary e ...·fort in 'Viet ·xa'!"!!..

Tnat :·epresents only abo1:t a third

of our annual dei'ense expenc..:-:::ures of over $70 'billion .

I

..
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c. year fer '.:ar . ; .... Vie-c

~a~:

means i.f the figure i>=> co:..:pared "::i -ch t'!'".e
0:1

Pres.:.der::c 1 s budget requests in J·anua:ty for

th~;.;

-~he

basis o:'

~he

co:-nin.; fiscal year,

for example:

uould

all federal transportation proposa:s,

. -••• '0'"'\ ~

..... lA,i._\,.4

__ .clud::.:::.g our huge h:.g:n_":;ay construc·cio-:: progra!'!'l
c... ••

of

d

sue~

item~

as high- speed

!'o..:.::..:.. oad anc. co.:1.':.uter services anc -che supersonic
pa~se~ger

airplane;

A year's cost o1 veterans' benefits and services
gro"~:;ing

out of all past ·wars could be met with 12

t..'eeks of cur:ren-c \•Jar expenditures in Viet Nam.;

Eigh·~ ~·:ee~s

all

o:· :Y!ili -cary expenses in Viet

:~am

equal

o=: the =:ede:cal :-..onies sought for education--

elementary, secondary) higher, vocational and
I

·.
- 8 -

inter-.'lationa2.--a:r.d the special f':.1nds ::'or inproving
education

i~ ci~y

cos~s

o'!

""1-

C..--

of the fecera:

dep:!'cssed

sl~~s a~d

areas;

affa:.rs p:rogra.ils

housing ar.d

gover'~~ent,

ru~a:

:.nc:udin6 slum clearance

and o·cher e:·torts to r:.ake Jch"' nation: s cities safer
and more sa·cisfying places fo:c human habitation

6 t.:eeks of ·che cos-c o:r: the Vic.·cnamese war;

represe~t

..
':'he e .,..
.....

.:-~"'

v-~

~i::.:.o~s

'-'

supporved on

or· :::-2ngry people abroad

·che e _uivalen·c of less \,han 4 \'Ieeks o:::~ •:-:a::c costs

.:.n Viet l!a:;:.

'!'he international c..ctivitie.:. in t·:hich vle participate
:.:·o:· the purposes of hurr.ani"t.arian and econor<1ic goals and above all, a
m.ore s·cable peace, can be expressed in

simila:~

an:1.ua: level of U.S. approp::::-:.ations... for
--~ericar..

stark contrasts .

exa~ple,

The

for ·che inter-

Alliance for Progress--r:mch of i·-:hich is repayable,
,,

I
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repres...,m~s

only abou·c 6

economist has e::;t.:..r.-1a·cec.

·.~eeks

tha"~

of ·.n::.:.:--co:.ts

One

""l""
... - c;..
.....

a needed red.:..str:.ou·cion

o;.~

:'ar:-:: la:"ld

·co peasc:mts -:::hroughc-..... ~ _::c.-::::.., ?akis·;:;an, ·cr.e coas·cal areas of As.:..a,
a.n . . . all

o~·

Latin

A..~erica,

could be brough'c about equitv.b::.y

Hi thout confi.,ca-cion, for abo-u:c $5 b.:..llion
vmuld be -che equi valen·c of

:.o

of

wee"c::;

~J:~r

o~he_·

U.~.

ccn~:-~b-.....-cio~

pros:ca ... ~ cr· tha-c

~.. .:.ssions ~n

cost.

T:1at

exp...,ndi "Ct:.res in Viet
su:;;gcsts that -c::e

Pinal:.y a look
entire annua:.

·..,o·.;.~:

O.L'

a~'1d

the : . .:..dd:.e

"(,0

the

o::·ganizat~on,

Eas·~,

rcgul~r

budget and to all

sucn as 1:.he peace :.r:.eeping

CypTus a."":d else'::her<:; comes -co 80 hou::-s

o:: 3 c. ..JS of vrar expenditures in Viet Na'!'n.
':::'ha·~

ou~

the great burden of Viel:. N·am has been met l:rith-

shi!'·cing the eco:·10my t;o a wa.rtime foo·cing c..nd with surprisingly

:i~tle

i~fla-cion

is a

proc.uc·c.:.. ve facilities.

co~~entary

on the vitality of the nation's

It is also a tribu-:::e to the skill ':lith \'.'"hich

·che President and his Ad:-::ir.istrat.:..on have conduc·ced -che federal
govern'!'nent's role in the nation:s economic and fiscal affairs .

/

..
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Nevertheless, it would be pointless t0 ignore the
prospect of a convergence of factors which may require us to accept
controls and higher taxes or alternatively, to suffer a serlous and,
in the end, destructive infl_ation.

We are approaching the point

·'"'here gro\'Ting needs in Viet Nam are begin..'1 ; ng to draw significant
n~~bers

of skilled workers out of civilian production into military

service and defense industries.

At the same time , there is no

corresponding decrease in the demand for consumer goods .

To fill

the gap in part, we import in greater and greater quantities and
this process, in turn, leads to grm: · ng complications and difficul ties in the balance of payments.
~fuatever

the economic implications , however, the

fundamental tragedy of Viet Nam lies not so much in those considerations as in the toll of human life and hope.

Already the over-all

casualties are more than one-third that of the

XCRO
("('If

Kore~n

xrRo

war.

XIRO
OI'Y

.·
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It is grim to speak of human suffering by way of
statistics, yet some numerical comparisons are necessary if we
are to understand the dimensions of Viet Nam.

In the first three

weeks of April, for example, 518 Americans were killed in action.
C9-'V"lA-

10 , 0

These young men joined fiear l y

oo

9,0~

others who have lost their

lives since U.S. troops were committed to Viet Nam.

So far the

number of young Pennsylvanians alone who have been killed in Viet
Nam is about equal to the entire student body of Haverford College.
C)'V-t/\...

6 (\

0 00

In addition to the dead, there have been 5§ 3 0@0
bO.. ooo

Americans wounded in Viet Nam.

To give this figure of 55f0Ge

some sense of the pain it has entailed, note that it would be the
equivalent if every man, woman and child in the city suffered an
injury in some sudden and appalling disaster in Haverford.
The civilian analogy is apt because in addition
to the military casualties which have occurred, the war in Viet
Nam inflicts great pain on those who are caught up in its crossfires and in the incredibly brutal fury which characterizes intraVietnamese political rivalries and hatreds .

Major General James
I
0
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H~~phreys,

director of our public health efforts in Viet Nam,

recently estimated that 50,000 civilians would be treated for
war- related injuries in government hospitals in South Viet Nam
this year .

Of course, this figure says nothing of the countless

deaths, accidental and unreported which are induced by military
action.

It says nothing of the political murders and mutilations.

It says nothing of the countless injured who go untreated in a
l~~d

of limited and, in many areas,

non - exis~nt

medical services.

The hostile military forces against whom we are
pitted have also been hard hit.
bined total of North

Vietna~ese

Official sources list the comand the Viet Cong killed in action
•

in South Viet Nam as 149,000 for 1966, with weekly totals at times
this year in excess of 2,000.

These figures are indicative of the

great destructiveness of the repertoire of modern weapons which
has been drawn upon for use in Viet Nam.

Yet, enemy forces continue

the struggle and actually, are growing in numbers.

The latest

- 13 -

Pentagon figures show enemy strength at record
today as compared to 239,000 a year ago.

levels --287 ~ 000

This increase is in the

face of an estimated loss of half- million in the war to date .
.,-...

Hhat was, scarccely t\vO years

ago~

preponderantly

a war among Vietnamese has now become preponderantly war between
hostile Vietnamese and U.S . forces .

The total number of American

ground forces in Viet Nam went from 45,000 in 1965 to 400,000 by
the end of 1966 .
there is

talk~

It is in the neighborhood of 450,000 today and

even now, of the need for an additional Marine

division and one or two additional army divisions.

The prospect

lA-~
of an increaseAbeyond 500,000 by the end of this year is not to be

dismissed.

This prospect, in fact, is enhanced by the recent

consignment of new responsibilities to the U.S . military command
in the work of pacification and the possibilities of the expansion
of the U. S . military effort into the delta regions of the Mekong .
United States forces having replaced the Saigon armies as the
principal combatant on the front lines in the North and Hest of

J

- 14 South Viet Nam may now be on the way to becoming the major military
element in the Southern sector and the rear areas.

This delta

region and the work of pacification•have heretofore been consigned
to the South Vietnamese authorities working in concert with a few
American civilian and military advisors.
There is currently, coincident with these changes,
some expression of views from "anonymous" but "official sources 11
that a military victory is just around the corner and that it can
finally be achieved by another new input of American forces and
effort .

The same feeling, however, it should be noted, has been

present in the past, prior to significant new inputs or usages of
U. S. military power.

And after each added military step, I

regr~t

to note the forecasts of an imminent resolution of the conflict
have ceased.
I think it is to be anticipated that the process of
increasing the U.S. military role in installments will go on, but
in my judgment the search for a decision by force of arms will be
as elusive as the quest for a just solution by diplomatic negotiaI

tions has so far proved to be .

- 15 In short, the prospects for a restoration of peace
in -che near future are not at all encourag::..ng .

:Te "Till do \·:ell to

face, nm·T, the fact that enormous risks lie ahead on the present
military course .

The prospect of a direct military conflict with

China obviously is somewhere along the path of an expanding \'Tar
in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia .
matter of policy,

~~e

It is not important that, as a

do not \·rish to threaten Ch::.nese interests on

the Asian mainland and have so stated

~any

times.

~lliat

is important

are the implications of our grm..:ing military effort in Viet Nam as
seen through the spectacles of Chinese xenophobia.
gyrations of the Chinese

11

cultural revolution 11 are indicative of

the immense enigma which China poses for
safe to assume,

~rith

The cosmic

o~

policies.

It is not

any degree of assurance, what may be the
•

eventual result of this great political upheaval in China .

It

may mean a more militant China; it by no means guarantees a less
militant China.

Insofar as we are concerned, there is no reason

to expect as a consequence of the inner struggle any reduction in
Chinese suspicion of us or any remission in the hostility with

- 16 \':hich they have regarded our course in Viet Nam from the beginning .
This response to us, in

Vie~ ~a~,

it should be noted, has its roots

at least as much in Chinese history and tradition as in Chinese
ideological theory.
To reiterate, the Chinese response to us in Viet
Nam will be little affected by current developments in China, in
the absence of other changes in the situation.

In any event, there

are signs that the ideological fury within that immense nation has
begun to abate .

Chinese foreign trade has not been cut by the

action of the Red Guards although it may suffer from the current
Hong Kong unrest.

So far as anyone is a\·:are the nuclear project

in Lop Nor continues to operate at full blast in the ;;e•t: n deserts
of Sinkiang.

Most important in its implications for Viet Nam, the

Chinese- Soviet conflict has been put aside at least sufficiently
to permit Soviet military supplies for Hanoi to flow unimpeded
overland through China .

J
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There is some tendency to dismiss the Chinese
as a significant factor in the considerations which should be given
our course in Viet Nam.

A preoccupation with the possibilities of

a U.S.-Chinese clash is regarded in some quarters as unwarranted,
to say the least.

The view is that the Chinese dragon, out of

preoccupation or prudence, will bellow but not bite.

It would be

well to recall that similar sentiments were expressed in connection
with Korea.

Indeed, they were expressed in a kind of whistling in

the dark even after the initial reports began to come in that the
Chinese had crossed the Yalu and clashed with U.S. forces in the
far North.
Since my memory goes
forgive me if I reiterate

~hat

b~ck

that far, I hope you will

the prospect of war with China

emerging from the Vietnamese conflict cannot be dismissed .

And

I hope you will forgive me if I reiterate, too, what I reported on
~<t-1)..

returning from Viet Nam

~

years ago.

(..ou.JUq
now:

the war in Viet Nam

I said then and I repeat

~

~ open-ended

and the end is not in sight.

/
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- 18 One of the most significant statements of General Westmoreland,
the able soldier who comnands the U.S. forces in Viet Nam, on his
visit in this country a fe,·r weeks ago, \'las that an end of the war
in Viet Nam is not in sight.
termination 'of the war .

Preeumably he meant a military

That \'las the sober opinion of a soldier

on a matter in which his professional competence gives his opinion
a special significance .
In the light of G.-

ter~l

Hestmoreland 's estimate,

it \·:ould seem to me to be prudent, as I have stated, to anticipate
an enlargement of the war in Viet Nam.

Yet I do not wish to suggest

that the war will inevitably escalate towards a grim infinity.

I

have suggested on occasion the possibility of limiting the military
conflict, so long as it must persist, to South Viet Nam.

Indeed,

the rationale for the bombing of the North can be eliminated on
the basis of a defensive military barrier on the ground, south of
the 17th parallel.

That could do ···hat aerial bombing of the North

was expected to do but has not
of supply and communication

XCRO

C'OPY

do~e,

bet~ ec~

namely, interdict the lines
north and south Viet Nam.
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John Sherman Cooper, of

Kentu c ~y,

recently asked that the

oomoing in the North oe limited to these supply routes and that,
too, is a

s~ep

towards limiting the war.
In the end, however, negotiations alone can supply

a sure and permanent limitation or termination of the conflict.
In the end, a way must oe found to negotiate an honorable peace .
That would oe a peace which is not sought on the oasis of an
elusive military triumph.

Rather it would oe a peace grounded

in the principle that the rights of the Vietnamese people are
paramount in this situation.
which are at stake.

It is their country and their future

Indeed, that is the principle which President

Johnson, Ho Chi Minh and all others concerned have contended is
the oasis for the current military efforts.
to initiate negotiations which

mi ~ht

The proolem 'is how

lead to a common concept of

the principle and agreement on means oy which it is to oe put into
practice.

XERO
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The effort to open negotiations to end the war has
been so far an exercise in complete frustration.

Countless pro-

posals have been advanced and they have come to naught.

I have

long felt, along with many others, for example, that the proper
. ~ehicle for peace talks is the Geneva Conferences .

These con-

ferences brought the war in Inco- China to an end in 1954 and in

1962, produced a treaty which, whatever its shortcomings, did
return a measure of peace to a Laos on

~he

verge of collapse.

The Geneva Conference has the merit of being recognized not only
by North Viet Nam, but by Chi na .

Getting the Conference partici-

pants to face up to their responsibilities, however, is another
matter.
I have also sougPt to have greater attention given
to the views General de Gaulle and Cambodia's Prince Norodom
Sihanouk and U Thant and I have advocated a meeting between
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and China's foreign minister, Chen Yi.
An all-Asian conference of friend and foe alike has also been

v• uo
()f • 't"
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proposed as an elaboration of last y enr's

~~nila

urged that the bri ef cease-fi r es ·,..h.;.c·'l · ~

· 1:· .re

periods in Viet NaT"! be extende d and coupled

meeting .

I have

seen during holiday

··~i th

a military "stand-

f ast" on land, se'J. and air as a pr e lude to negotiations .

I have

.J-p~
suggested that
nat~on

So~th

VietNam's borders be

International Control
~~en

inspecte~by

the three-

Con~izsion .

it became apparent that traditional secret

diplomacy had failed to open up a road to negtiations , I began to
urge last fall a formal and open U.N. contribution to the effort to
restore peace sho·.lld be sought .

\Hth all due respect to U Thant ,

the dedicated Secretary- General, the U. N. as an organization has yet
to face up to the responsibi li t.; eo \·:!Jich are imposed by this situation .
I do not th:nk -anyonz exncc+s miracles from that
organization but I do think that all members of the U.N . have

&~

obligation to make a concerted contribution through its machinery
to the search for peace .

It would appear to me to be most appropriate,

for example, for the Secu'Y'ity Co·J.ncil to issue a call by formal
resolution to all l'lho are directly or ind: ,..ectly engaged in Viet Nam--

.,.

)(

fl('l

xcno

( ' f'IPY
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member

~~d

or Geneva .

non-member of the U.N. alike--to confer in New York
A

co~frontation

of positions and a consideration of

v;ays and means to resto!'e peace in Viet Na:n in this fashion is in
order and it is urgent .

I do not kno\-.r v:hether it would be effective

out I see no reason why it should not be attempted or why this
nation

~hould

0 -"-"~ ~

not take a strong initiative in connection therewith.

~~~/VI~, -~-#.,./~~ "'-~~f-

.;.~ ..~ ~ ud"r. ~tt'
~~'·
::-n v:::..e,·: of the t: · ~s-~:i.:nat e of the Viet Nam \'tar,
£<.

•,othich I have just given you,

yo~

''where do I come in O!', perhaps,
when does he get out?H

r-ay be asking at this moment:
~·;here

do I get out, or, perhaps,

As I told you at the outset, I do not have

punch-card answers , either for the war in Viet Nam or in terms of
its personal implications .

For you, the concern is direct.

draft is already an important

con~:dcration

in your life.

The
But

concern for ending the conflict needs to go beyond the immediate
problems of the draft, import nt

that may be to each individual.

The implications of a ru.Yl-a\o;ay war, \':ith full Chinese involvement
and even Russia at a later

~tage

are stagger·ng to contemplate.
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- 23 Even ,.·ithout a great
of Americans and

t he lives of addit i onal thousands

exp~.nsion,

Asi~~s ,

both mi:itary and civilian, are forfeit,

if we do not achieve an end to this conflict in the near f uture.
The '·:ell- being of the U.S. econo:ny, which i s, after all the under pinning of our international position, is a t sta ke .

The survival

of hurr.a.nism, if not of huinani ty itself, is i ncrea singly thrown
into doubt as the persistence of -'.:;he '·:ar induces the removal of
restraints and an even greater callousness to human suffering .
As graduates, you have o. special responsi bility
as \·:ell as a

spec~al

concern .

It ::. s lo.rger than protest .

It is

a responsibility to try to understand and to contribute to the
understanding of others so that no stone may be left unturned in
the search for peace .

Much has happened sinc e Dien Bien Phu .

Many persons have been invo::.. ·.r eo --Co:T~unists and non- Communists,
Americans and
been made .

forei~~ers, De moc~ ~ts

Good :.ntentions ra·:c

the question is not

11

and Republicans .
en distorted.

Mistakes have

At thi s late date,

Who got us here and why? 11 but "where do we go

from her e and how? 11
x r:Ro
~orv
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In connection therewith, I hope that.I have at
least made the point
b~ieve

th~~

as one American, as one Senator , I

without reservation that it is in the interests of the

United States and all others involved in Viet Nam and the world to
·scale down these hostilities as quickly as possible .

I believe it

is in the common interest to get to the conference table without
delay, to bring this war to an honorable end and to begin using
the

i~~ense

energy and resources which are now preempted by the

conflict for the constructive works

~I
f

"

UO
'"

o~

peace .
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